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Summary 
 
After the division of Cyprus in 1974 into a Greek-Cypriot south and a Turkish-Cypriot north, 
approximately 30,000 immigrants from Turkey moved to north Cyprus. The period 1974 to 
1980, during which time these immigrants came to northern Cyprus, is referred to as the first 
wave of immigration. This thesis seeks primarily to answer the question: Why did the 
immigrants leave their homes in Turkey in this period, and why did they migrate to northern 
Cyprus? There are a lot of misperceptions about the immigration of people from Turkey to 
north Cyprus, which makes this thesis important in creating an accurate and much-needed 
debate. In short, one should view the first wave of immigration as a result of the employment 
of state mechanisms, as well as traditional push-pull factors in the context of crisis in Turkey, 
coupled with opportunities and a need for labor in north Cyprus. Furthermore, family 
members and other persons of authority, such as imams, were central in encouraging more 
people from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus during the first wave of immigration. In that 
way immigration from Turkey was kept alive with a steady flow of immigrants throughout 
the seven-year period following the division of the island. The immigration from Turkey was 
characterized by being heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, in contrast to the common view 
of the immigrants as an exclusively “Turkifying” force.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite being Europe’s longest ongoing conflict, the Cyprus dispute is relatively unknown. 
At the same time, the Cyprus conflict is a very known and discussed topic among Cypriots, 
obviously, and Turks and Greeks. The history of modern Cyprus is broadly speaking 
characterized by a two-sided narrative, pertaining to each of the two ethnic groups on the 
island (although there are alternative leftist histories on both sides). For the Turkish-Cypriots 
the conflict started with the inter-communal violence that plagued them throughout the 
1960s, with particularly 1963-64 and 1967 as excessively violent years. On the Greek-
Cypriot side, the Turkish invasion in 1974 is seen as the beginning of the dispute.1 Since the 
division of the island in 1974, no solution has been reached between the two sides. One of the 
major points of contention between the two communities is the presence of immigrants from 
Turkey.  
 
Subject of research 
This thesis studies the first wave of immigration from Turkey to northern Cyprus; that is in 
the period from 1974-1980. In 1974 Turkey intervened in Cyprus in response to the Greek-
led coup d’état toppling the Cypriot President Makarios III. In addition to having been the 
President of Cyprus since the island gained its independence in 1960, Makarios was also the 
Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus. As a result of the intervention, Cyprus 
was divided into two: a Turkish-controlled north Cyprus in possession of approximately 36 
percent of the island, and the independent Republic of Cyprus in the south. When Cyprus was 
divided in 1974, the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community, with the help of Turkish 
authorities, initiated a policy of encouraging people from Turkey to move to northern 
Cyprus.2 This happened in the context of a population vacuum in the north created by the 
exodus of Greek-Cypriots who were displaced or fled to the south, away from the advancing 
Turkish army.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Papadakis, Yiannis, History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot Schoolbooks on the “History of Cyprus”. PRIO Cyprus Centre Report 2/2008. Oslo: Peace Research 
Institute of Oslo (PRIO), 2008, 14, 9. 
2 Richter, Heinz A., A Concise History of Modern Cyprus, 1878-2009. Mainz and Ruhpolding: Franz Philipp 
Rutzen, 2010, 202; Ramm, Christoph, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’ and (Trans)National Identities 
between Turkish Nationalism, Cypriotism and Europe.” Bochum: Ruhr University, 2009. Unpublished Doctoral 
Thesis. 
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From which areas of Turkey did these immigrants leave, what social strata did the migrants 
belong to, and what was their ethnic composition? Why did they leave their homes in Turkey 
in this period, and why did they migrate to northern Cyprus? Also, importantly, why were the 
immigrants from Turkey needed in north Cyprus in this period? Lastly, was the first wave of 
immigration successful in contributing to both an economic and political independence from 
the Greek-Cypriot south?  
                                                                                                                                        
Although it is quite clear that the Turkish immigrants came as part of a deliberate policy to 
consolidate Turkish-Cypriot control over northern Cyprus and ensure economic self-
sufficiency from the Greek-Cypriots, the PRIO Cyprus Centre (PCC) senior researcher Mete 
Hatay points out that many of the Turkish immigrants came to northern Cyprus on their own 
initiative. This mainly applied to those who came after 1979, but also to those who came 
throughout the first wave of immigration.3 This suggests that it must have been more 
advantageous for many to leave mainland Turkey and start a new life in northern Cyprus. 
This, in turn, strengthens the assumption that either all, or at least some of the three main 
factors this thesis seeks to study, namely the social, economic and political situation, were 
more opportune in north Cyprus than in the areas of mainland Turkey where the majority of 
immigrants came from. The fact that the Turkish authorities offered “land, houses and live-
stock to villagers who would migrate to Cyprus” was, unquestionably, a major factor 
involved when they made the decision to move there.4 The social anthropologist Dr. Yael 
Yael Navaro-Yashin argues that “[m]ost settlers are in Cyprus because they had experienced 
difficulties, some social, some economic, some political, in Turkey.”5 Due to the immigrants’ 
mostly humble background, they were, after the initial Turkish-Cypriot enthusiasm for them, 
often looked down upon. Those who emigrated from Turkey were mainly disadvantaged, 
both economically and socially. Furthermore, many were chosen for migration to north 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hatay, Mete, Beyond Numbers: an Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern 
Cyprus. PRIO Cyprus Centre Report 4/2005. Oslo: Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), 2005, 13. 
4 Fosshagen, Kjetil K. Island of Conjecture: State Modalities and Historical Trajectories in Cyprus. The degree 
of doctor rerum politicarum (dr.polit). Bergen: University of Bergen, 2008, 209.  
5 Navaro-Yashin, Yael, “De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict Between 
Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey” in Papadakis, Yiannis, Nicos Peristianis & Gisela Welz (eds.), 
Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2006: 84-99, 91 
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Cyprus because they were victims of developmental projects, resulting in the destruction of 
their villages and homes, which were occurring across Turkey at the time.6 
 
The Turkish-Cypriots increasingly view the immigrants from Turkey who now reside in the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an “other”.7 Navaro-Yashin, writing about 
the Turkish immigrants on Cyprus, claims that “[c]onflict with “Greek Cypriots” did not 
preoccupy or worry them [the Turkish-Cypriots] as much as their everyday experiences of 
living with settlers from Turkey”.8  There is a popular and typical perception that the Turkish 
immigrants are voluntarily an extension of Ankara’s policies. Many Turkish-Cypriots feel 
that the presence of the Turks from the mainland is contributing to their cultural elimination, 
and that they are becoming a minority in their own country.9 However, the arrival of the 
immigrants should be seen in light of differing living conditions in Turkey and northern 
Cyprus during this period.  
 
Therefore the migration should rather be analyzed from the perspective of the economic, 
political and social conditions under which the new Turkish immigrants lived, and the 
opportunities they expected from migrating to north Cyprus. This contradicts the view of the 
immigrants as colonizers from Turkey, which political scientist Christos P. Ioannides and 
other critics have described them as.10 In fact, professor Neophytos Loizides argued that “the 
overwhelming majority of settlers opted to abandon their villages in Anatolia for economic 
reasons, not ideological ones”.11 Furthermore, many were forced to move from their villages 
in Turkey due to the construction of dams and highways, and the consequent destruction of 
their homes. Moreover, landslides and other natural disasters affected many. Since space 
opened up in north Cyprus following the division of the island, many were relocated there.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Findley, Carter Vaughn, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity. New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2010, 327; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Atun, Hakkı in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus conducted on 22 February 2013. 
7 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not recognized by any countries, except Turkey. 
8 Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”, 87.  
9 Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”, 94.  
10 Ioannides, Christos P., In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province. 
New Rochelle: Caratzas, 1991, 188. 
11 Loizides, Neophytos, “Contested migration and settler politics in Cyprus”. Political Geography, Vol. 30, 
Issue 7: 391-401. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2011. 395. 
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Literature 
Between 1974 and the 2003 the borders between north and south were closed, which has 
effectively restricted communication and contact between the two communities. This has in 
effect led to a lack of knowledge about one another, and in turn created many misconceptions 
and myths about the other.12 One of the things that are especially prone to misunderstandings 
and exaggerations, are questions regarding immigration from Turkey to north Cyprus after 
1974.13 There are great arguments on both sides as to how many immigrants from Turkey 
there really are in northern Cyprus as a result of the immigration.14 While discussions on this 
topic have raged in Cyprus, between north and south, few have researched this aspect of the 
Cyprus conflict.15 This has both posed a challenge, and sparked an interest in studying it. The 
lack of research on Turkish migration to north Cyprus means that there is not a great deal of 
literature dealing specifically with the subject. Furthermore, the primary sources and archival 
information available on the topic are not mapped out. Although this certainly has been a 
challenge, it makes this thesis all the more necessary and therefore has been an incentive to 
produce new and much needed research.  
 
Despite the lack of literature on this specific subject, there exists a broad catalogue of books, 
articles and dissertations specifically on the Cyprus conflict, and on the history of Cyprus in 
general. This conflict awakens strong feelings within both communities on the island, and 
within Turkey and Greece. Therefore, much of the literature on the conflict is very biased one 
way or the other. This is especially the case with historical works, as each side uses history to 
prove that they are the true victims in the dispute.16 Although this is mostly the case with 
authors that are Greek-Cypriot, Turkish-Cypriot, Greek or Turkish, it also occurs in works by 
academics that are none of the above. Thus, in reading works on Cyprus, as with everything 
else, one must obviously be very careful and be aware of how the authors approach the 
conflict. This is especially the case in the subject of those who migrated from Turkey to 
northern Cyprus in the period 1974-1980. They are often referred to as “settlers”, but as the 
anthropologist Rebecca Bryant stresses, “they do not resemble settlers in other colonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Papadakis,Yiannis, Nicos Peristianis & Gisela Welz, “Modernity, History and Conflict in Divided Cyprus” in 
Yiannis, Peristianis & Welz (eds.), Divided Cyprus: 1-29, 24. 
13 Hatay, Mete, Beyond Numbers, vii-viii. 
14 Hatay, Mete, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?: An overview of the ethno-demography of Cyprus 
in the light of the preliminary results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot census. PRIO Cyprus Centre Report 2/2007. 
Oslo: Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), 2007, ix 
15 Hatay, Beyond Numbers, vii. 
16 Papadakis, History Education in Divided Cyprus. 
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nationalist projects”.17 Therefore, this thesis will for the most part refer to those who came to 
north Cyprus in this period as immigrants, rather than “settlers”. This is in order to accentuate 
that although they mostly came as part of an immigration policy, they moved in pursuit of an 
improved life. They were for the most part subjects, rather than objects. 
 
The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), which has offices in Cyprus, the PRIO Cyprus 
Centre (PCC), has a specific Project Group working on “Settlers and Immigrants in Cyprus”. 
Its project leader, Mete Hatay, has written at least two major reports regarding those who 
have come from Turkey to north Cyprus.18 He has mapped where the majority of the 
immigrants originally came from: The majority moved to north Cyprus from the East and 
West Black Sea sub-regions; Central Anatolia; and Southern and Southeastern Turkey. These 
were, and still are, disadvantaged regions of Turkey, where the living conditions were, and 
continue to be, generally lower than elsewhere in the country. Interestingly, many of the 
immigrants had no previous knowledge of where Cyprus was.19  
 
Hatay seeks to demystify the debate on “settlers” and immigrants from Turkey. He has 
therefore done a lot of work with the censuses that have been carried out in northern Cyprus. 
It has been claimed that Turks were encouraged to move to north Cyprus in order “to 
strengthen the position of parties supporting the regime of [north Cyprus’ first President] 
Rauf Denktaş.”20 Hatay refutes this argument, and shows that the immigrants have various 
party affiliations, and have not contributed to Denktaş’s victories to the extent that is 
commonly believed. Hatay has also questioned the widespread belief that the Turkish-
Cypriots have been outnumbered by mainland Turks.21  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, on the other hand, discusses the 
“settlers” as colonizers, and argues that the inflow of immigrants from Turkey, and the 
outflow of native Turkish-Cypriots have turned the latter into a minority in northern 
Cyprus.22 In terms of how many Turkish immigrants who now reside in north Cyprus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Bryant, Rebecca & Christalla Yakinthou, Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey. Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012, 
27 
18 Hatay, Beyond Numbers; Hatay, Turkish Cypriot Population.  
19 Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 12.  
20 Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 1. 
21 Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 49; Hatay, Turkish Cypriot Population. 
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”. Oct. 2006, accessed 
24 Jan. 2012. <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus06_en/cyprus06_en?opendocument> 
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numbers vary between a low of 70,000 and a high of 160,000.23 All the reports agree that 
“[m]ost of the settlers were transferred to Cyprus as the result of a decision of the Turkish 
authorities”.24 According to Alfons Cuco, reporting for the European Council’s Committee 
on Migration, Refugees and Demography, “the settlers had preserved their original social, 
economic and cultural characteristics.”25 His report appears to have a lot of similarities with 
the Cypriot government’s views on northern Cyprus. They argue that the immigrations, or 
“settlers” in their view, should be moved back to Turkey because they allegedly are turning 
the local population into a minority. Cuco also expresses the common misconception, refuted 
by Hatay, that the “settlers” mostly vote for Denktaş’s political party.26 These two reports, 
however, do not focus on where the immigrants came from in Turkey, what the social and 
economic situation was there, and why they chose to start a new life in Cyprus. There is 
generally a lack of detailed comparative discussion and analysis of the social, economic and 
political situations in the two countries in the period, a deficit this thesis seeks to reverse. 
 
A handful of books, and some dissertations, have also been of help in gathering information 
on the issue. Kjetil Fosshagen’s master and PhD theses in anthropology both discuss the 
settlement of people from Turkey in northern Cyprus, and study their co-existence, or in 
many cases the lack thereof, with the local Turkish-Cypriots.27 Navaro-Yashin studies the 
same subject in his contribution to the book Divided Cyprus.28 He points out that the 
“[s]ettler communities from Turkey are not homogeneous; they have a complex 
composition.”29 That is, the first wave of immigration consisted of members of different 
ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. This is contrary to the reports conducted by the 
Cypriot government and the EU, which seem to view the immigrants as more or less 
uniform.30  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hatay, Turkish Cypriot Population, 48; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal 
Demographic Changes”.  
24 Cuco, Alfons, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus.” Rep. no. Doc. 6589. 1992. Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography. Accessed 27 Feb. 2012. 
<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/20C7614D06858E9FC2256DC200380113/$file/cuco%20report.pd
f?OpenElement>. 
25 Cuco, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus”.  
26 Cuco, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus”. 
27 Fosshagen, Kjetil, ““We don’t exist”: Negotiations of history and identity in a Turkish Cypriot town.” Cand. 
Polit. Degree. University of Bergen, 1999; Fosshagen, “Island of Conjecture”, 209. 
28 Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”.  
29 Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”, 91. 
30 Cuco, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus”; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, 
“Illegal Demographic Changes”.   
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Professor of political science Clement Dodd has studied the economy and politics of northern 
Cyprus. He shows that similarly to most societies having gone through a recent war, north 
Cyprus was in a difficult situation, both economically and politically, following the invasion 
in July-August 1974 and the consequent forced departure of Greek-Cypriots.31 There was an 
abundance of agricultural land, and a lack of labor in northern Cyprus, which made it more 
inviting for immigrants from Turkey. Considering that the mainstream of the Turkish 
immigrants were “impoverished, landless peasants from Anatolia”, moving to the fertile and 
land-abundant Cyprus seems quite logical.32  
                                                                                                                                               
Sources 
There are some great obstacles in studying this aspect of the Cyprus conflict. First of all, the 
realization that the state-encouraged immigration of people from Turkey to north Cyprus was 
illegal by international law, as according to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its 
1977 amendment, has in turn affected the availability of archival sources regarding this 
policy.33 Tamer Gazioğlu, Chief of Resources, Inventory and Statistics Section in the 
Ministry of Housing and Rehabilitation in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus from 1975, 
admitted that no information gathered in this period on the settlement and immigration of 
people from Turkey was kept or stored.34 This obviously places limitations on the research 
that can be carried out on the subject. However, interviews with key political actors, officials 
and immigrants have been central to this thesis. The politicians and officials have been 
surprisingly open about the process. This is notable, considering that there are no documents 
available on the subject of the first wave of immigration, as such documents were either 
destroyed or not kept.  
 
Despite the general lack of documents in state archives, some of the interviewees had some 
primary sources available that they had kept. This is one of the major advantages in using 
oral sources, particularly in such cases where archival sources are difficult to find or non-
existent. Historians Knut Kjeldstadli and Paul Thompson highlight that informants often 
produce items, pictures or documents, and that this “could be the most valuable by-product of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Dodd, C.H., “From Federated State to Republic: 1975-1984” in Dodd, C.H. (ed.), The Political, Social and 
Economic Development of Northern Cyprus. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1993: 103-135, 108. 
32 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 39. 
33 Ker-Lindsay, James, The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011, 88. 
34 Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Gazioğlu, Tamer in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus conducted on 21 February 2013. 
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an interview.”35 Mustafa Yeşil, for instance, whose father was responsible for the migrants to 
north Cyprus from his town in Turkey, had some important documents revealing how 
organized the migration process was. Yeşil, who I interviewed, immigrated to north Cyprus 
along with his family in 1975. Neriman Çakır, a second-generation immigrant who has 
written extensively on second- and third-generation immigrants from Turkey, has shared her 
knowledge on the subject and provided some photographs of immigrant families from the 
period in question. Yusuf Suiçmez, one of the four Suiçmez children that moved to northern 
Cyprus in 1975, also provided some photographs during my interview of him and his family 
of their migration from Turkey. Hakkı Atun, the first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation 
in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, shared some reports he had authored about the 
immigration process.  
 
In using interviews as sources, it is important to find informants that are representative and 
relevant.36 Furthermore, it is important to collect a wide range of interviews in order to more 
accurately complete the puzzle that is the past.37 Altogether, I have interviewed 23 people, of 
whom 16 were immigrants, five were politicians or officials during the first wave of 
immigration, and two were academics on the subject. Most of the interviewees have been 
open and willing to share their name and where they were from. However, some of the 
immigrants wished to remain anonymous, which has been respected.  
 
A lot of invaluable information has been gathered from these interviews. In order to obtain 
the most accurate and factual accounts, the interviews have been conducted with non-leading 
questions. Kjeldstadli has pointed out that one may better trust accounts that are formed from 
open interviews where the interviewer has not posed leading questions, but rather allowed the 
interviewee to tell a more or less continuous, uninterrupted story about a period or event in 
their lives.38 At the same time, it is important not to allow the interview to “degenerate into 
little more than anecdotal gossip.”39 Therefore, the interviews conducted for this thesis have, 
in order to allow for comparison and a piecing together of the puzzle that this period 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Thompson, Paul, The Voice of the Past: Oral History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, 174. 
36 Kjeldstadli, Knut, Fortida er ikke hva den en gang var: en innføring i historiefaget. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1999, 195. 
37 Kjeldstadli, Knut, “Kildekritikk” in Hodne, Bjarne, Knut Kjeldstadli & Göran Rosander (eds.), Muntlige 
kilder: Om bruk av intervjuer i etnologi, folkeminnevitenskap og historie. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981: 66-
84, 68. 
38 Kjeldstadli, En innføring i historiefaget, 196; Thompson, Oral History, 165; Kjeldstadli, “Kildekritikk”, 70. 
39 Quote by Roy Hay, as quoted in Thompson, Oral History, 169. 
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represents, asked a set of common and routine questions to the interviewees about their 
geographic, ethnic, religious and linguistic origins and backgrounds, when they left Turkey 
and where they settled in north Cyprus.40  
 
Importantly, the immigrants that have been interviewed have told their stories in their native 
tongue, Turkish, and thus language has not been a hindrance for them in telling their 
memories. In order to gather information and sources for the thesis, I have taken lessons in 
Turkish, and learned basic oral and written Turkish as well as learning about Turkish culture. 
In addition, I have received invaluable aid from the senior researcher Mete Hatay, who has 
functioned as an interpreter and contact person in these interviews to make sure that all the 
information needed was passed over and understood. My knowledge of the language and 
Turkish customs gave the interviewees a sense of trust and confidence in me. The politicians 
and officials, on the other hand, most of who have studied in Great Britain or the US, were 
interviewed in English, so that all technical and political terminology was properly grasped.  
                                                                                                                                                     
One of the advantages of using oral sources is that it better allows one to get “behind 
stereotyped or non-committal generalizations to detailed memories”.41 However, it is 
important to be critical of all sources, especially oral ones. The period in question was nearly 
four decades ago, and it is therefore not always easy for the interviewees to remember the 
events in great detail. One must take into account and be aware that memories and oral 
recollections of them are prone to forgetfulness and mistakes.42 For the immigrants, however, 
the immigration process naturally represented a great change and turning point in their lives. 
Therefore, they tend to remember the period in great detail. Moreover, Kjeldstadli highlights 
that with time one is able to speak more balanced and neutrally about an event in the past 
because one has had the time and distance to reflect about it. In turn, interviewees are often 
more willing and able to share their experiences as well.43 However, it is obviously important 
to be critical of all interviewees. They may attempt to protect themselves and their families 
by hiding certain information or details. Therefore, in order to obtain various experiences and 
stories to crosscheck, it has been critical to interview many different immigrants from this 
period. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Thompson, Oral History, 168. 
41 Thompson, Oral History, 170. 
42 Kjeldstadli, En innføring i historiefaget, 196. 
43 Kjeldstadli, “Kildekritikk”, 69. 
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Interviews serve the subject of this thesis particularly well because they contribute to an 
enlivenment to the immigration process and a proximity to the immigrants themselves. It 
contributes to the humanizing of them as subjects. Furthermore, anecdotes about particular 
memories, for instance the welcoming ceremony many experienced when they arrived in 
north Cyprus, add an element of color to the thesis.44   
 
In the case of the politicians and officials, things may have been added or left out in order to 
save face, both on their own behalf and on behalf of the state they played a crucial role in 
setting up. It is therefore crucial to be critical of the information given by them. Nevertheless, 
Atun, north Cyprus’ first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, held that “there is nothing 
to hide.”45 This statement must be taken with a pinch of salt. It is natural to presume that it 
was said in order to appear reliable, but the fact that records were destroyed or not kept 
implies that the Turkish-Cypriot authorities indeed feel – or at least felt – a need to hide 
something. On the whole, however, all interviewees, both politicians and officials, and 
immigrants, seem to have been more or less reliable, honest and open. PRIO Cyprus Centre 
(PCC) senior researchers Mete Hatay and Ayla Gürel, the two academics interviewed for the 
thesis, have been important and have contributed to filling the holes left by the lack of 
archival sources and intermittently evasive officials and politicians. 
                                                                                                                                               
While there is a general lack of archival sources specifically on the migration and 
immigration process, there is a set of sources on economic and political aspects of northern 
Cyprus in the same period. In addition, there is a set of documents written by Atun, found in 
the archives, that outline the methodology involved in resettling Turkish-Cypriot refugees 
from South-Cyprus, and he has held, in a private interview with the author, that much the 
same methods were used in settling immigrants from Turkey. The illegality of the 
immigration process has obviously led to a silencing of the subject. However, now that many 
decades have passed since it happened, those involved seem to be willing to discuss it after 
all these years. This has made this research possible and important.      
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Rosander, Göran, “«Muntlige kilder» – Hva og hvorfor” in Hodne, Kjeldstadli & Rosander (eds.), Muntlige 
kilder: 11-21, 21; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Yeşil, Mustafa in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus, conducted on 8 April 2013. See chapter 5 of this thesis. 
45 Interview with Atun. 
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Theory 
Professor John McGarry, in his article “‘Demographic engineering’: the state-directed 
movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation”, has examined the ways in 
which states can encourage or force the movement of an ethnic group to another region, that 
is “demographically engineer” an area. He argues that there are two different groups who 
move or are moved in this process, either “agents” or “enemies”. “Agents” are, according to 
McGarry, given advantages such as housing, work and/or land.46 They are provided for in a 
new location because they “are intended to perform a function on behalf of the state.”47 
McGarry claims that “[a]gents are settled in particular regions to consolidate the state’s 
control of the area and its resources”, and are in that way used as demographic facts on the 
ground in order to solidify the state’s control over a disputed area.48 “Enemies”, on the other 
hand, are seen as a problem for the state in the areas that they currently inhabit, and are 
moved elsewhere in order to minimize the chances of conflict. The risks feared include 
secessionism or revolts in general, which are attempted solved by moving these trouble 
groups to other regions where they might not have the same opportunities to mobilize. He 
continues by claiming that in times of inter-state conflict and crisis, states become especially 
attentive to the question of minorities, and control of peripheral areas.49  
 
People may also simply move on their own initiative through ordinary push-pull factors, such 
as socio-economic considerations. Nevertheless, McGarry argues that “[p]olitical authorities 
can manipulate push-pull factors” in a way that hides forced or encouraged movement behind 
a veil of seemingly normal economic or social factors.50 In the case of north Cyprus, 
promises of a better life, through the provision of housing and land, certainly contributed to 
the considerable extent and amount of immigrants in this period. To the extent that Turkey 
carried out “demographical engineering” in northern Cyprus, in the sense that McGarry 
applies the term, it may seem that both “agents” and “enemies” were encouraged and/or 
forced to immigrate. There are many cases in which state-encouraged immigration occurs 
following a country’s procurement of new territory. In north Cyprus there was a need for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 McGarry, John, “‘Demographic engineering’: the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of 
conflict regulation”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, No. 21, Vol. 4: 613-638. London: Routledge, 1998, 619. 
47 McGarry, John, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 614-615, 619. 
48 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 616. 
49 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 625. 
50 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 617, 619. 
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Turkish-Cypriots to cement their control over their new territorial acquisitions.51 There were 
also significant agricultural resources that needed to be taken care of. This was an incentive 
to settle “agents”. Turkey, in the period in question, certainly fits the description of being 
crisis-ridden, economically, socially and politically, which may have been a factor involved 
in moving “enemies” away from Anatolia. Was this the case with the first wave of 
immigration to north Cyprus? Were minorities among those who moved from Turkey to 
northern Cyprus in this period?    
 
Professor Robert Jervis, in his work Perceptions and misperceptions in international politics, 
observes that “[d]ecision-makers assimilate evidence to their pre-existing beliefs without 
being aware of alternative interpretations”. 52 The authorities are simply so convinced of their 
established ideas, that all information given or acquired is interpreted as proof of their 
biases.53 This is a notion that to a great extent may be seen in the case of Cyprus as well, 
especially in the Greek-Cypriot view on the Turkish immigrants, but also among many 
Turkish-Cypriots who gradually became more critical of the immigration from Turkey. The 
researcher Mete Hatay argues that “[b]y referring to them as ‘settlers’, the implication is that 
all Turkish nationals present on the island arrived and continue to arrive as part of a state 
policy of ‘colonization.’”54 In order to analyze and test such statements, one must ask: What 
kind of conditions did those who immigrated to northern Cyprus leave behind in Turkey? 
Why were they willing to leave their homes in Turkey in this period, and start new lives in 
north Cyprus?  
 
There is a widespread view that the original Turkish-Cypriot population is a minority in their 
own country because of the immigration of people from Turkey. This perception is largely 
the result of a misinterpretation of the census numbers, which reveal that the de facto 
population of Turkish nationals, that is counting all the people who happen to be in northern 
Cyprus at the time of the census, is greater because of Turkish tourists, students, seasonal 
workers and the around 30,000 military personnel present in the north. None of these have 
either voting rights or TRNC citizenship. Hatay points to the 2006 census, which reveals that 
there is a much larger number of Turkish-Cypriots than Greek-Cypriots have assumed, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 629-630. 
52 Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and misperceptions in international politics. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976, 409. 
53 Jervis, Perceptions and misperceptions, 181. 
54 Hatay, Turkish Cypriot Population, 5. 
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that the de jure population count, that is those with permanent residence at the time of the 
census, shows a greater number of Turkish-Cypriots compared to Turkish nationals.55 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus’ report, “Illegal 
Demographic Changes”, makes use of terms such as ethnically cleansing in explaining that 
“[t]he constant influx into the occupied area of settlers from mainland Turkey takes place in 
parallel with a continuous outflow of indigenous Turkish Cypriots”.56 This evidences a 
failure to properly examine the issue, and shows that convictions that may be based on 
rumors may prevail. That makes this research ever the more important and pivotal in 
discussing the future of a potential solution to the Cyprus conflict.                       
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Hatay, Turkish Cypriot Population”, 39, 48. 
56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”. 
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2. From Ottoman Conquest to Turkish 
Intervention 
 
Cyprus has been under the possession of most of the great civilizations and powers in the 
Mediterranean region, most importantly the Ancient Greek, Byzantine, Venetian and, not 
least, the Ottomans. Before it got its fragile independence in 1960, it had also belonged to the 
British Empire. All of these cultures have undoubtedly made their mark on the island. 
However, the Greeks were the only people to really settle on Cyprus before the Ottomans 
came in 1571.57 Thus, the Ottoman arrival on Cyprus created the bi-communality that would 
be the central challenge for the island in the future age of ethnic nationalism. In combination 
with other outside factors, the bi-communal character of Cyprus led to its physical and 
political division in 1974.   
 
Ottoman rule: 1571-1878 
Before the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, in 1571, the island had been ruled by Venice. Their 
rule had been utterly corrupt.58 Moreover, the Venetians ruled the island in a feudalistic 
manner. Had it not been for the Ottomans, Cyprus could very well have been Catholic. Such 
was the extent of the Venetians’ Latinisation of Cyprus according to the historian and 
journalist Jan-Erik Smilden.59 Due to the Venetians’ suppressing politics, the Cypriots, 
broadly speaking, greeted the Ottomans with open arms and relief. The millet system, which 
followed Ottoman conquest, gave the Greek Orthodox population on the island control over 
their own institutions, such as education and religion.60 The millet system was an essential 
part of Ottoman governance, wherein the non-Muslim population was granted the right to 
organize their own religious community in which their own rules applied and their own 
language was spoken and taught in.61 It may rightly be argued, therefore, that the Greek 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Asmussen, Jan, Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis. London & New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2008, 11. 
58 Finkel, Caroline, Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2005, 160. 
59 Smilden, Jan-Erik, “When the Turks saved the Greek Cypriots: Selective Memories of 300 years under 
Ottoman Rule” in Benum, Edgeir, Alf Johansson, Jan-Erik Smilden & Alf Storrud (eds.), Are We Captives of 
History?: Historical Essays on Turkey and Europe. Oslo: Unipub forlag – Oslo Academic Press, 2007: 71-81, 
72-73.  
60 Volkan, Vamik D. & Norman Itzkowitz, Turks & Greeks: Neighbours in conflict. Huntingdon: The Eothen 
Press, 1994, 132. 
61 Abu Jaber, K. S., “The Millet System in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.” The Muslim World, Vol. 
57: 212–223. Hartford, Connecticut: Duncan Black Macdonald Center, Hartford Seminary, 1967, 212.  
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Orthodox population had more rights and self-autonomy under the Ottomans. They reinstated 
the power of the Greek Orthodox archbishop, who, in accordance with the millet system, 
regained the control over his subjects and the right to collect taxes from them.62  
The Ottomans immediately set out to settle their own population on their newly conquered 
territory. However, they were unable to encourage people to willingly move to Cyprus. 
Settling in Cyprus simply did not seem attractive. The island lacked fertile, grazing land. As a 
result, the Ottomans had to resort to the forced resettling of people from Anatolia.63 This was 
a central part the Ottoman practice of establishing a Muslim population “along sensitive 
frontiers and in other areas of strategic importance.”64 Initially, able peasants were moved to 
the island.65 But in 1572, the Ottomans changed their minds: they decided that one in ten 
families from four randomly selected Anatolian provinces should be picked out to move to 
Cyprus, and that those “who registered but did not leave were to be hanged”.66 However, 
those sent to the island were given certain advantages, such as being exempt from paying 
taxes over a two-year period; in addition they were given land.67   
 
Why do states encourage the movement of peoples from one place to another? According to 
Professor John McGarry, both “agents” and “enemies” are moved or encouraged to move in 
this process. “Agents” are given benefits in the new area because they are sent to serve a 
purpose for the rulers.68 In the case of Ottoman Cyprus, the initial settlers were moved there 
in order to secure and affirm Ottoman control of the island. “Enemies”, on the other hand, are 
considered to be a threat or a problem in the areas that they currently inhabit, and are 
therefore moved elsewhere in order to minimize their potential for revolt.69 The Ottomans 
eventually had to resort to sending criminals who were expelled from Anatolia to Cyprus.70 
“[U]nruly religious students, brigands and minor officials who had fallen from favour”, and 
generally those “considered a threat to the stability of society” were forcibly moved to the 
island.71 In this way the Ottomans, during their reign over Cyprus, from 1571 until 1878, 
changed the demographics of the island and steadily increased the percentage of Muslims. By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Smilden, “When the Turks saved the Greek Cypriots”, 72. 
63 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 161.  
64 Volkan & Itzkowitz, Turks & Greeks, 126. 
65 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 161. 
66 Smilden, “When the Turks saved the Greek Cypriots”, 75. 
67 Inalcik, Halil, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica, No. 2: 103-129. Paris: Maisonneuve-Larose, 
1954, 123. 
68 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 619. 
69 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 617. See chapter 1 of this thesis. 
70 Inalcik, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, 123.  
71 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 162.  
	   17	  
1600, 85 percent of Cyprus’ population was Greek Orthodox, and 15 percent were Muslim. 
The ratio had changed to 72 and 24 percent respectively by the end of Ottoman rule in 
Cyprus in 1878.72  
 
British rule: 1878-1960 
In return for their help against the Russian attacks on the Ottoman Empire in 1877 – an 
offensive that threatened to completely alter the balance of power in the Eastern 
Mediterranean – Britain was given Cyprus through the Cyprus Convention on 4 June 1878. 
At first the British leased Cyprus until they annexed it in 1914, and finally it became a Crown 
Colony in 1925. Initially, the British saw the control over Cyprus as vital in order to protect 
the Suez Canal, and thus the safe passage to India. Furthermore, it was argued that the 
possession of the island was crucial in maintaining power in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
However, this would change in 1882, when Britain took control over Egypt. Therefore, after 
having acquired Egypt, the British did not devote as much attention to Cyprus.73 
Nevertheless, the militarily strategic value of Cyprus, as illustrated by the British bases on the 
island, would later prove to be quite important after all, particularly during the Cold War.74  
 
For the most part, the British maintained the Ottoman system of religious division. This was 
particularly true within education, where Christians and Muslims remained separated and 
were taught by Greek and Turkish teachers respectively. Furthermore, schoolbooks were 
imported from Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and after 1923 from Turkey.75 In this way, 
the school system resulted in “constructing Greek and Turkish identities among the 
respective Christian and Muslim populations.”76 From this point on forward, it makes more 
sense to refer to the two communities by their ethnicity: Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot.   
 
It was under British rule that the two ethnic groups of Cyprus drifted apart, and irredentist 
feelings bloomed among them. Since Greece had achieved independence already in 1830, 
Greek nationalism became a potent and influential force among the Greek-Cypriot population 
in Cyprus quite early. The idea of incorporating Cyprus into the Greek state, or enosis (a 	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Greek word meaning union) grew out of the Megali Idea (Greek meaning The Great Idea). 
This Greek nationalist concept revolved around uniting all Greeks and recreating the 
Byzantine Empire in a more modern form.77  
 
Turkey, on the other hand, became independent nearly a century later, as a result of the 
Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the First World War. From 1908 until 1913 Ottomanism had 
been the ruling ideology of the declining Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism sought to keep the 
empire glued together through awarding equal rights to all Ottoman subjects, regardless of 
language or religion.78 Turkish nationalism, which came in two opposing forms, developed 
relatively late compared to other ethnic groups in the region. Pan-Turkism desired a union 
consisting of all Turks and Turkic peoples. The second type of Turkish nationalism saw only 
Anatolia as the homeland for a Turkish state, and rejected the ambition of gathering Turks 
from outside of the Anatolian heartland. The latter became the version of Turkish nationalism 
employed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s founding father and first President.79 As a 
result, the Turkish Cypriot Muslim population, rather than developing their own equivalent to 
enosis, initially became more closely connected to the British. They were a relatively small 
minority and saw the British as the best guarantors of their safety and well-being.80  
 
Nevertheless, the situation in Cyprus was closely connected to developments in the mother 
countries. The Greek dream of the Megali Idea and the Greek-Cypriot equivalent of enosis 
illustrated the way ideas and aspirations in Greece affected and inspired the Greek-Cypriots. 
The same was the case for the Ottoman Empire’s, and later Turkey’s effect on developments 
on the island. In 1923, for example, after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, which ratified a 
mandatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey, Turkish-Cypriots were 
encouraged to move to Turkey. 9,310 Turkish-Cypriots moved to Turkey in this period.81  	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During British rule the ethnic identities of the two communities on Cyprus were truly 
developing and the populations were being pulled apart. Although it was largely due to 
“irredentist propaganda on the part of the Greek and Turkish states”, it was also a result of 
“demands for freedom, equality, and representative politics” developing among the islanders 
during British rule.82 The problem was that these desires were ethnically motivated. Parallel 
to this development the two mother countries, Greece and Turkey, were increasingly getting 
involved in the question of the future of Cyprus. Greece declined when Britain offered them 
Cyprus in 1915 in exchange for entering on the British side in World War One. Nevertheless, 
Greece involved itself in the question of Cyprus. Moreover, the idea of enosis had many 
supporters in Greece. However, due to British pressure on Greece, and Greece’s reliance on 
Britain, the Greek government did not dare be too aggressive on supporting union with 
Cyprus.83  
 
Furthermore, in 1930 Greece and Turkey reached an agreement in which it was decided to 
engage in peaceful co-operation. The period from 1930 until the Second World War may thus 
be characterized as a Greek-Turkish détente, which neither side desired to jeopardize over 
Cyprus.84 Thus, Greece did not get involved with Cyprus to any large extent until after the 
Second World War. The Turkish government, on the other hand, did not take much interest in 
Cyprus at all until the mid-1950s. Turkey’s delayed interest in Cyprus may be linked to the 
predominance of Kemalism in the ruling circles of the government since the independence of 
the country. This is the ideology born out of Kemal Atatürk’s views on the construction and 
policies of the Turkish state.85 Important in this respect is “the Kemalist dictum of the 
avoidance of involvement in extra-territorial conflicts”.86 However, although the Turkish 
government was reluctant to get involved in Cyprus, both the press and the general public in 
Turkey took a strong stance in the question of Cyprus’ future.87  
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The road to a fragile independence: 1950-1960 
By the 1950s a series of developments drastically changed the situation on Cyprus, and both 
Greece and Turkey got more involved in the question of the island’s future. Greece, which 
had just come out of a civil war and could therefore focus more outward, became 
increasingly preoccupied with Cyprus from 1949 on forward and paid close attention to the 
situation on the island. Moreover, there was widespread support for enosis among the Greek 
public, which made it hard for the Greek government to ignore developments there. In mid-
January 1950 Bishop (soon to be Archbishop) Makarios organized a plebiscite on the union 
of Cyprus with Greece. The tally showed that 96 percent of the participating Greek-Cypriots 
supported enosis. The landslide result of this plebiscite caused a reaction in Turkey and 
generated a Cyprus policy by the Turkish government. Turkey realized that it could no longer 
ignore the Cyprus question. In addition, popular opinion in Turkey required government 
action. When students took to the streets in most of the major cities in Turkey, Fuat Köprülü, 
the Turkish foreign minister, stated that Turkey sought to preserve the status quo of Cyprus 
and would intervene to prevent enosis.88  
 
The British ignored the outcome of the plebiscite. As a result, the immediate Greek-Cypriot 
goal became to bring the question of Cyprus’ union with Greece and thus effectively the end 
of British rule to the United Nations. Central in this policy was the newly elected Archbishop 
of the Church of Cyprus Makarios III (elected in 1950).89 In bringing the issue into the 
United Nations, Makarios internationalized the Cyprus question. The British further 
complicated the situation by promoting Turkey’s involvement in the question and made the 
argument to the Greek government that Cyprus was important to Turkey as well.90 Thus it 
may be argued that the two mother countries, Greece and Turkey, were pulled into the 
question of Cyprus from forces within Cyprus and by the British. At the same time, popular 
opinion within their own borders required attention and forced a policy of some kind.91 The 
Turkish and Greek governments “were drawn into the maelstrom of the Cypriot 
developments”.92 Also, the Cold War initially gave Turkey greater leverage on the 
international scene. Turkey became a full member of NATO already in 1952, and was one of 	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few NATO countries that bordered directly to the Soviet Union. It was thus seen as an 
important political and military outpost for the West in the Cold War.93 This perception of 
having leverage encouraged Turkey to take a firmer stance on Cyprus. Furthermore, Turkey 
felt threatened by the growth of pan-Arabism among its Middle Eastern neighbors, thus 
creating an incentive to acquire some sort of power on the island in order to gain a 
geographically strategic base.94   
 
The United Nations General Assembly did not take a stance on the Cyprus question and thus 
avoided adopting a resolution. Consequently, the Greek-Cypriot leadership, which had 
decided to bring the question into the UN in the first place, realized the need for a different 
approach. Colonel George Grivas formed the Greek-Cypriot guerilla organization National 
Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kypron Agoniston: EOKA) with support 
from Makarios. Grivas was a Greek-Cypriot who had fought for the Greeks in the Turkish-
Greek War in the 1920s, and who was an ardent supporter of the Megali Idea. EOKA’s 
primary goal was the union of Cyprus and Greece. Although both Turkey and the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership claimed that EOKA sought to harm Turkish-Cypriots, the organization 
was designed to fight solely the British in order to end colonization and ultimately carry out 
enosis. However, the goal of enosis was by definition discrimination against the Turkish-
Cypriot minority, who did not wish to become an even smaller minority as a part of Greece. 
Even if EOKA did not aim to harm Turkish-Cypriots in their fight for de-colonization, they 
certainly were directly affected. Hundreds of Turkish-Cypriots were wounded or killed as a 
result of the EOKA campaigns in the period 1955-1958.95  
 
In the same period the Turkish-Cypriots developed their own version of enosis, namely 
taksim, or the division of Cyprus. In fact, the Turkish-Cypriots established their own guerilla 
group, the Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı: TMT), “which also 
used terrorist methods like their Greek-Cypriot counterparts.” 96 In reaction to EOKA’s 
violent campaigns and their strive for the union with Greece, violent anti-Greek protests 
broke out in Istanbul and Izmir on 6 September 1955, resulting in the death of sixteen 
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Greeks.97 This is yet another example of the interconnectedness between events in Cyprus 
and the two mother countries.  
 
The changing nature of the Cyprus conflict, from a colonial conflict to an ethnic conflict with 
international ramifications, thus also required new solutions. The ethnic violence that had 
broken out in 1955 and intensified through the end of the 1950s had resulted in great 
casualties in both communities. This period resulted in the death of 55 Turkish- and 60 
Greek-Cypriots, while the number of wounded was 86 and 98 respectively. The great rift 
between the two communities and the ensuing violence had proven the need for a creative 
solution deemed acceptable to both parties: sufficient safety for the Turkish-Cypriot minority 
and an acceptable level of self-determination to the Greek-Cypriot majority. Although 
Turkey and Greece initially had been hard on their respective demands – the Greeks seeking 
enosis, and Turkey desiring partition, or at least a strong degree of political influence coupled 
with a military base on the island – they both somewhat receded in 1959 and agreed to find 
an alternative solution and achieve Cypriot independence without carrying out neither taksim 
nor enosis. It is perhaps surprising that Turkey as suddenly as they had become involved in 
the dispute, changed their policy and overarching goal on the Cyprus issue. This turn-around 
may be explained by a desire by both Turkey and Greece to restore their friendly relations of 
the 1930s.98   
 
The geopolitical situation at the end of this decade may give a clue as to why this ambition 
resurfaced. Although NATO certainly needed Turkey as Europe’s easternmost frontier 
against the Soviet Union, Turkey arguably needed NATO even more. This was especially 
true as Iraq retreated from the Baghdad Pact in 1959 following nationalist coup d’état in 
Baghdad in 1958, and, together with Syria and Egypt, approached the Soviet Union in order 
to obtain weapons and economic support.99 Turkey thus not only viewed the Soviet Union 
itself as a threat, but also the growing strength of pan-Arabism. Since a majority of NATO 
countries were supporters of Cyprus’ independence, and Greece did not exclude withdrawing 
from NATO on the basis of Cyprus, Turkey saw the necessity of toning down its 
aspirations.100 In that sense Turkey may initially have overplayed their hand in using the Cold 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 95.  
98 Markides, “Cyprus since 1878”, 17; Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 87-88, 92. 
99 Dawisha, Adeed, “Egypt” in Sayigh, Yezid & Avi Shlaim (eds.), The Cold War and the Middle East. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997: 27-47, 32-34; Howard, The History of Turkey, 129-130; Zürcher, Turkey, 236. 
100 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 88. 
	   23	  
War setting as a pretext for their original hard position on Cyprus. Turkey may have 
overestimated its importance in the NATO alliance and its leverage vis-à-vis the other 
members. At the same time, unlike Turkey, Greece depended on the Western Alliance 
completely. Thus, as both Turkey and Greece had over-estimated their influence in the 
region, the need for compromise became clearer. Greece, Turkey and Great Britain got 
together to discuss and outline Cypriot independence at the Zürich and London conferences 
of 1959. In classic colonial spirit, the Cypriots, both the Turkish- and the Greek-Cypriot 
communities, were completely left out of the talks. To prevent a war between Greece and 
Turkey was the primary goal, with the independence of Cyprus simply as a means of 
reaching this goal.101   
 
The two conferences led to final agreements on Cypriot independence. These were signed on 
19 February 1959 in London. The result was the formation of the Republic of Cyprus, which 
came into being on 16 August 1960. Many observers described its constitution as 
ineffectual.102 The dividing policy pursued by the British had prevented the evolution of a 
specific Cypriot identity. In its place, separate Turkish and Greek identities had been 
strengthened and were increasingly in opposition to each other. Therefore the constitution 
was built along consociational lines, meaning that the ratio of parliamentary membership was 
based on ethnic affiliation. Although there were approximately 18 percent Turkish-Cypriots 
and 81 percent Greek-Cypriots in Cyprus at the time, membership to the House of 
Representatives was set up on a 30:70 ratio. In order to close down this gap the Turkish-
Cypriot minority, 30 percent of the members, were awarded the right to veto. This same ratio 
was applied to the public service in general, deeming it quite ineffective.103 According to the 
political scientist Joseph S. Joseph, “the state never functioned properly.”104 In addition to the 
specific set-up of the House of Representatives, the President of Cyprus was set to always be 
a Greek-Cypriot, while the Vice President would always be Turkish-Cypriot.105  
 
Also imbedded in the new Cypriot constitution were three treaties directly involving foreign 
countries, thus further limiting authentic Cypriot independence. First, the Treaty of 	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Establishment allowed the British to maintain 256 square kilometers on the island and set up 
the Dhekelia and Akrotiri Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), which both the British and the 
Americans saw as vital to preserve Western influence and power in the area, vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union.106 Second, the Treaty of Alliance gave Turkey and Greece the right to military 
posts on the island, in total amounting to 650 Turkish and 950 Greek soldiers. The treaty was 
constructed so as to protect the two communities from being attacked by the other. It was also 
a part of the designs for the third treaty, namely the Treaty of Guarantee, which allowed for a 
trilateral, bilateral or unilateral – by Turkey, Greece and/or Great Britain – intervention in 
order to prevent the union between Cyprus and a second country.107  
    
In extension of direct Greek and Turkish presence on Cyprus, as provided by these treaties, 
the two mother countries continued to provide school curricula and teaching staff as part of 
the persisting policy of separated education based on ethnicity, with roots from the Ottoman 
millet system and British colonial policies. This was therefore a further obstacle to creating a 
common Cypriot identity.108 The imported material and staff from the mother countries 
“implanted a Greek or a Turkish identity with matching nationalism and the concept of an 
enemy”.109 The Treaty of Guarantee attempted to prevent political union between Cyprus and 
a second country, that is either Turkey or Greece. However, since both Greece and Turkey 
had been included in the internal affairs of the island, there already was a strong cultural 
union between the mother countries and their respective ethnic brothers in Cyprus.110  
 
Even though the complicated system of power-sharing that was constructed in the Cypriot 
constitution was created to avoid further bloodshed, a major problem remained in that the 
underlying conflict was not properly addressed, namely a strong sense of ethnic separation 
between the island’s populations. The more or less peaceful co-existence, in which the two 
communities originally had lived until the end of the British colonial period, had to some 
extent broken down in the 1950s. Separation within education prevailed and cultural ties 
were drawn between each ethnic group and their respective motherlands, rather than between 
the two communities. Thus, it was obvious that both taksim and enosis were goals still 
pursued, rather than abandoned. Inter-communal violence was therefore bound to spread once 	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again unless serious steps were taken towards creating a common identity. Although the 
period from 1960 to 1962 may be characterized as peaceful years in Cyprus, its brevity 
reveals the true lack of success in curbing the violence that the 1950s featured.111    
 
Constitutional breakdown: 1963-1967  
Neither of the two communities was willing to reduce or disband their paramilitary forces, 
resulting in the upholding of the Greek-Cypriot EOKA and the Turkish-Cypriot TMT.112 This 
again illustrates the lacking trust in the constitution that had allegedly been created to keep 
inter-ethnic violence from reoccurring. There seemed to be little reason to trust each other 
studying Makarios’ speech in September 1962, in which he declared that as long as the 
Turkish-Cypriots remain on the island “the duty of EOKA cannot be considered as 
terminated”.113 The Turkish-Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, continued to insist that 
partition would be the only solution if the protection of their minority could not be 
ensured.114  
 
Both sides waited for an opportunity to prove that the constitution could not bring about the 
desired peace, and thus carry out their original ambitions, i.e. enosis and taksim. Meanwhile, 
the Turkish-Cypriot minority, although fully aware of the total ineffectiveness of the 
constitution, persisted on retaining the advantages they had been given, such as the right to 
veto. In an attempt to override these minority privileges, the Greek-Cypriot leadership, with 
Makarios in the lead, suggested a thirteen-point modification of the constitution.115   
 
Both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community rejected these amendments, as they took 
away the very privileges that had made them accept the constitution in the first place. 
Especially threatening to them was Makarios’ proposal to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee, 
which gave Turkey, along with Greece and Great Britain, the right to intervene if union 
between Cyprus and a second state was carried out.116 The situation created by Makarios’ 
thirteen points was indeed so tense that even the smallest incident could escalate into civil 
war. This is precisely what happened on 21 December 1963. What started as an insignificant 	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incident in the old-town of Nicosia, involving a standard ID-inspection of a small group of 
Turkish-Cypriots, quickly spread into violent riots throughout Cyprus. As a result, both 
EOKA and TMT mobilized, and both groups carried out indiscriminant killings, plundering 
and pillaging.117  
 
The initial Christmas massacre, as the Turkish-Cypriots referred to the first days preceding 
21 December, spread quickly across the island.118 Greek-Cypriot “paramilitary, running 
amok, murdered women and children, plundered and destroyed Turkish property and took 
hostages.”119 The escalation of what started as a minor episode resulted in a civil war lasted 
until 10 August 1964. 174 Greek-Cypriots and 364 Turkish-Cypriots were killed in this 
period.120 As opposed to the ethnic violence that took place in the 1950s, this civil war 
resulted in the physical separation of the two communities, and the creation of Turkish-
Cypriot enclaves. Approximately 60 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot minority moved to the 
established enclaves (see Map 1 below). The majority of them lived in these areas until 1974, 
when the Turkish invasion led to the actual partition of Cyprus.121 Consequently, the ethnic 
separation of the Cypriot population has been more or less constant from 1964 until today.122 
Once the civil war broke out and enclaves were in place, the Cypriot government broke 
down, and Turkish-Cypriot representatives were excluded since Greek-Cypriot 
representatives held meetings in the Greek sectors of the island.123 From this point forward, 
therefore, the Cypriot government and parliament refer only to Greek-Cypriots. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 120-121. 
118 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 120-121. 
119 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 121. 
120 Meyer, James H. “Policy Watershed: Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of 1974.” Case Studies in 
International Diplomacy. WWS Case Study 3/00. Princeton University. 28 Oct. 2010, accessed 01 Mar. 2011.	  
<http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/cyprus.pdf>, 10. 
121 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 130-131. 
122 This separation has been given a new dimension ever since people from Turkey increasingly immigrated to 
Northern Cyprus from 1974 onwards: See chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
123 Volkan & Itzkowitz, Turks & Greeks, 140. 
	   27	  
	  
Map 1: Cyprus: Population Movement Since 1958.124  
 
Since the Turkish-Cypriots were excluded from government, as a result of them living in 
enclosed enclaves separate from the Greek-Cypriot majority, they established their own 
institutions through which they governed themselves. Initially, in 1963, a General Committee 
was set up to take care of the everyday needs of the Turkish-Cypriot population. In December 
1967, in response to the reemergence of inter-communal violence, a Provisional Cyprus 
Turkish Administration replaced the less comprehensive General Committee. This 
administration was involved with everything from resettling the Turkish-Cypriot refugees 
from around the island to education and the running of the economy. In this way the Turkish-
Cypriot minority were becoming more independent in their isolation from the rest of the 
island.125 As the situation seemed to be at a standstill, despite the absence of serious inter-
communal violence after 1967, the Turkish-Cypriots established the Turkish-Cypriot 
Administration in 1971. A further step towards political separation was taken in September 
1974, after the Turkish intervention had divided the island, when the Turkish-Cypriots 
formed the Autonomous Turkish-Cypriot Administration. The eventual independence of the 
Turkish-Cypriot population in 1983, with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC), therefore, is the result of these gradual developments from 
1963.126  
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Through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 186, adopted on 4 March 1964, the 
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established. This peacekeeping force was 
set up in order to secure peace and prevent further outbreak of violence. The first troops 
arrived on the island on 14 March 1964. This was a direct response to Turkey’s threat, the 
same month, of military intervention if violence against Turkish-Cypriots did not cease.127 
Despite the introduction of the UNFICYP forces in mid-March 1964, fighting continued in 
Cyprus, and when the Greek-Cypriot parliament agreed to “establish an army and to import 
large quantities of arms”, Turkey saw no other option than to intervene militarily.128 Fearful 
of Soviet involvement in the Cyprus conflict, the United States’ President Lyndon B. Johnson 
discouraged, in a strongly worded letter to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, Turkey 
from intervening.129 This letter, popularly referred to as the Johnson Letter, “destroyed the 
Turkish primal trust in American leadership.”130  
 
Compared to the violence of 1963-1964, the period from August 1964 to November 1967 
was relatively calm. However, it too led to casualties. 60 Greek- and 109 Turkish-Cypriots 
were killed in the latter period.131 An explanation for the decline in violence is that the two 
communities for the most part lived in separate areas and were protect by UNFICYP forces. 
However, since occurrences of inter-ethnic violence did persist, Turkey got involved once 
more. While Greece largely remained outside the conflict in the earlier civil war, it got 
increasingly involved in the situation of 1967. Greece became a military dictatorship in 1967 
and, as a nationalistic government, desired to reinforce the fight for enosis.132 Since the junta 
takeover in Greece in 1967, the country’s “policies toward Cyprus led from one disaster to 
another.”133 Since the civil war in 1964, when the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities 
were to a large extent completely separated, the latter had experienced an economic growth 
that far surpassed that of the other, more isolated, community. The economy of the Greek-
Cypriot sector became stronger even than that of Greece.134  
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Parallel to this development, Makarios’ international influence had grown immensely. He had 
become a central actor among the non-aligned of the Cold War. Thus, enosis seemed less 
appealing to the Greek-Cypriot leadership in this period because a union with Greece would 
reduce Makarios’ importance.135 At the same time, Makarios continued the division between 
the two ethnic groups. He insisted on the maintenance of the (Greek) Cypriot National Guard 
despite the continued presence of UNFICYP forces and the armies of Turkey and Greece, as 
ratified by the Treaty of Alliance. This led to further fears among the Turkish-Cypriot 
minority for their safety. All of these dynamics were bound to cause a new rift in the fragile 
triangle, consisting of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.136  
 
When inter-ethnic violence again broke out in November 1967, a Greek-Turkish conflict 
appeared probable. Similarly to the crisis in 1964, which nearly caused an intervention by 
Turkey, the situation in 1967 threatened to internationalize the conflict. Even a conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union could have taken place as a result of the 
developments. This was largely because the Soviet Union supported Makarios with weapons, 
while at the same time eyeing the Greek military junta in Athens with great skepticism. As 
both Greece and Turkey were NATO members, it was highly undesirable for the United 
States that a conflict between them could break out. Therefore, the US, once again, used its 
powerful influence to stop Turkey from intervening in 1967.137 However, similarly to prior 
crises and their conclusions, “a settlement of the broader ethnopolitical conflict never came 
within sight … the basic problems of Cyprus remain[ed]”.138 The two communities still lived 
separately, and the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves remained in place. Despite having lost face by 
being prevented from intervening a second time, Turkey was able to exert some influence and 
carry out certain important changes. Turkey, in fact, used pressure to force Colonel George 
Grivas and his paramilitary men in the (Greek) Cypriot National Guard out of Cyprus along 
with 15,000, out of 17,000 Greek soldiers stationed in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the two 
thousand that remained would some years later prove to be integral in a new and even bigger 
crisis.139    
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Turkey’s intervention: 1974140 
The crisis, which truly and markedly changed the history of Cyprus, occurred in 1974. The 
relationship between the Greek-Cypriot leadership, with Makarios in the lead, and Greece, 
ruled by a military junta since 1967, had ebbed. The Greek National Guard, stationed on 
Cyprus as a part of the Greek contingent stipulated in the Treaty of Alliance, organized a 
coup against Makarios on 15 July 1974.  Their aim was to carry out enosis. Turkey therefore 
decided to act. Turkey felt that it had been humiliated in the two previous crises when they 
were prevented from intervening, something they saw as an affront to their perceived legal 
right to protect their ethnic brothers.141 The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, elected in 
1973, made it clear to the Turkish parliament that Turkey would “act more assertively … to 
put an end to the ‘humiliations’ suffered in … Cyprus.”142 The opportunity to do so came 
when, as a result of the coup against Makarios, the coup-makers appointed Nikos Sampson as 
the new President of Cyprus. Sampson had come to be known as a Tourkofagos (Greek 
meaning Turk-eater) during the civil war of 1963-1964, when he was directly responsible for 
the death of 20 Turkish-Cypriots. Choosing Sampson as the new leader was a grave mistake, 
one that was sure to be viewed with great suspicion and fear from both Turkey and the 
Turkish-Cypriots.143  
 
The Greeks may have realized the risk involved in this decision. Therefore they attempted to 
remedy the provocation through trying to prove that the coup was an internal conflict 
between Greek-Cypriots. In fact, the coup had been carried out because the Greek military 
junta viewed Makarios with great skepticism, and he was seen as the “only reason that Enosis 
had not been implemented.”144 There had been no attacks on the Turkish-Cypriots on the first 
day of the coup. Nevertheless, this was irrelevant to Turkey, which used the Treaty of 
Guarantee as a pretext to intervene in Cyprus. This treaty gave the three guarantor powers the 
right to intervene, multilaterally if possible, or unilaterally if not, in order to prevent the 
political union between Cyprus and a second state. It was hardly a secret that the Greek 
government was involved in the coup, and it was even less of a secret that Sampson and 
EOKA B (a new and more extreme version of the original EOKA), which he led, desired to 	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unite Cyprus with Greece.145 Turkey, in full accordance with the treaty, consulted Great 
Britain with a proposal to intervene in Cyprus to restore the 1960 constitution and reinstate 
Makarios as President. If the British had agreed to join the Turkish, Turkey would most likely 
not have been able to split the island in two as it did in August 1974. In that case, an 
intervention would be carried out from the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), which were 
both in the south, areas further away from Turkey and thus harder to control and maintain.146   
 
When the British refused to get involved, Turkey took matters into their own hands and 
intervened unilaterally. Turkish troops landed in Girne in northern Cyprus on 20 July 1974, 
only five days after the coup. There has been a lot of speculation about how Turkey was able 
to mobilize so quickly, and some claim that it must have been the result of an American 
conspiracy to divide the island.147 However, the northern coast of Cyprus was and still is only 
75 kilometers from Southern Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey had been prepared to intervene in 
Cyprus twice previously. As opposed to the two previous occasions, it was now much easier 
for Turkey to intervene because it had improved its military technology.148 In addition, the 
Greek National Guard contingent on the island had been greatly reduced after the crisis of 
1967. This increased both the likelihood of a Turkish intervention and the prospect of 
success.149 In direct opposition to the previous crises, NATO took a conciliatory stand 
towards Turkey and the alliance’s Secretary-General, Joseph Lüns, argued that “Turkey was 
more important for the Alliance than Greece. If there were a Turkish intervention, world 
opinion would back it.”150 It was therefore made quite clear to Turkey that they would be 
given the green light, and there seemed to be little risk in intervening.  
 
Turkey’s military operation may be divided into two phases. The first phase was an 
intervention. In fact, the Turkish delegates at the NATO Council meeting on 21 July claimed 
that Turkey intervened on Cyprus in order to reestablish “normality and constitutional 
order”.151 In other words, it would adhere to the rules and stipulations of the Treaty of 
Guarantee. Already by 22 July 1974 Turkey concluded a victory that resulted in the fall of the 	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Greek military junta and the ousting of Nikos Sampson. Thus, only two days after military 
intervention, Turkey had fulfilled its role as a guarantor power. Nevertheless, it did not stop 
there. Despite the ceasefire that was instated after Turkey had taken Girne on 22 July, Turkey 
continued to mobilize troops to the island. Furthermore, in direct opposition to both its stated 
goal, and its right as a guarantor, Turkey was responsible for numerous violations of human 
rights, such as attacks on civilians, raping, plundering and treating prisoners poorly.152 It was 
therefore no surprise that Turkish-Cypriots were harmed and subject to violence only after 
Turkey intervened, at which time “the National Guard started an all-out attack on Turkish-
Cypriot villages and quarters of mixed villages and towns.”153 What was at first an internal 
Greek conflict, therefore, had, through a spiral of violence, developed into yet another inter-
communal conflict.  
 
Despite the ceasefire from 22 July, violations and troop movements continued on both sides. 
Two peace conferences were held at Geneva, the first from 23-31 July, and the second from 
8-13 August 1974. However, no solution was reached. As a result, Turkey decided to initiate 
a second operation. The second military operation was an outright invasion. It resulted in the 
division of the island.154 At this point “Turkish and Greek roles vis-à-vis the status quo have 
… been completely reversed, with Ankara openly advocating the overthrow of the 1960 
accords and Greece defending them.”155 Whereas the first operation was allegedly intended to 
prevent enosis and in that way reestablish the original constitution, the second operation 
clearly served to create a permanent and strong Turkish presence on the island.  
 
After the invasion ended on 16 August 1974, Turkey possessed 36 percent of the island, 
protected by a substantial force of 40,000 troops.156 Both communities were affected by the 
violence. 700 Greek and 250 Turkish soldiers lost their lives, while 192 Greek- and 965 
Turkish-Cypriots were killed in the 1974 war. An even more emotional matter, still subject to 
heated debates on both sides, regards the 2,001 still missing persons from both communities, 
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of which there are 1,508 Greek-Cypriots and 493 Turkish-Cypriots.157 As with most wars, 
neither side had a monopoly on victimhood, just as neither had a monopoly on perpetration.  
                                                                                                                                      
Population vacuum 
In addition to the relatively high number of casualties and missing persons, a population 
vacuum was created through the vast numbers of internally displaced persons. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 240,000 internally 
displaced as a result of the division of the island, of which approximately 180,000 were 
Greek-Cypriots who moved south, and 60,000 were Turkish-Cypriots that went north. This 
was a great amount, considering that in 1974 the entire population of the island amounted to 
around 600,000.158 The exodus of 180,000 Greek-Cypriots from the part of the island now in 
Turkey’s hands therefore resulted in a population vacuum in the north. It is in this context 
that the Turkish government and the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community, seeing the 
need to fill this vacuum, initiated a policy of encouraging people from Turkey to move to 
northern Cyprus. 
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3. Developments in northern Cyprus 1974-
1980 
 
As with any area involved in a war, the Turkish intervention of July and August 1974 had 
significant negative impacts on the political, social and economical development of northern 
Cyprus. Although north Cyprus, which consisted of 36 percent of the island, possessed fertile 
lands and the most developed tourist areas of Cyprus, it was the hardest hit economically. 
This was largely due to a population that was too small to fully take advantage of the 
economic potential of the north. However, it was also attributable to its lack of international 
recognition. Politically, the Turkish-Cypriots became even more isolated than before, and 
they were the clear losers despite the military superiority of Turkey, which intervened in their 
favor. The international community made its stance clear on 1 November 1974 when 
resolution 3212 was passed in the UN General Assembly with 117 votes for, no votes against, 
and no abstentions. It called for all foreign troops to withdraw and for all states to uphold the 
independence of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Rauf Denktaş, Vice President and international 
representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community, accentuated that he sought either a 
federation with considerable autonomy for the Turkish-Cypriot community or the 
establishment of a totally independent Turkish-Cypriot state. The Turkish-Cypriots, due to 
their isolation from the international community, were in dire need of support from Turkey, 
which was their only source of economic and political assistance. As a result, after 1974, the 
political, social and economic structures of northern Cyprus were increasingly influenced 
from Turkey.159 It was in this context of close co-operation with Turkey, that the first wave of 
immigration was made possible.  
 
Initial political developments 
Much of the relocation of populations between north and south was done by the end of 1974 
as people on both sides had fled due to the war. However, most of those remaining on the 
“wrong” side of the buffer zone were transferred after August 1975. The Vienna III 
Agreement had been concluded on 2 August 1975 between Denktaş as representative of the 
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Turkish-Cypriot community and Glacfos Clerides as representative of the Greek-Cypriots.160 
The Vienna III Agreement stipulated the following:  
1. The Turkish Cypriots at present in the south of the island will be allowed … to proceed north 
with their belongings … with the assistance of UNFICYP. 
2. … the Greek Cypriots at present in the north of the island are free to stay and be given every 
help to lead a normal life, including … [the] freedom of movement in the north. 
3. The Greek Cypriots at present in the north who, at their own request and without having been 
subjected to any kind of pressure, wish to move to the south, will be permitted to do so. 
4. UNFICYP will have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the 
north. 
5. … priority will be given to the reunification of families, which may also involve the transfer 
of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the south, to the north.161 
 
The Turkish-Cypriots, in contrast to what Vienna III actually stated, interpreted the 
agreement as a population exchange and referred to it “as the ‘1975 Vienna Population 
Exchange Agreement’ or the ‘Voluntary Re-Grouping of Population Agreement’”.162 A great 
majority of the Turkish-Cypriots who found themselves in South-Cyprus following the war 
took up on the offer, stated in the agreement, to move north. Thus, after a couple of months 
only 130 Turkish-Cypriots remained in the south. The Greek-Cypriot population in northern 
Cyprus, on the other hand, dwindled at a slower pace (in 1978 there were still 1,600 Greek-
Cypriots living in north Cyprus).163 The movement of Greek-Cypriots from north Cyprus to 
the south and Turkish-Cypriots living in Southern Cyprus moving in the opposite direction 
was largely done with the aid of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP). They helped transport people across the buffer zone, and provided the refugees 
with food and relief supplies.164 
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The Turkish-Cypriot’s erroneous reading of the agreement was due their principle view on 
the solution to the Cyprus conflict, namely that “bizonality is the key parameter of a 
settlement”.165 Therefore, as a consequence of the agreement, both the north and the south of 
the island were more or less completely ethnically cleansed by 1975. The Turkish-Cypriot 
interpretation of the Vienna III Agreement was a major element in their design to turn Cyprus 
into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.166 These terms, like almost every element in the 
Cyprus conflict, meant different things to the two parties involved. As opposed to the 
Turkish-Cypriot view, the Greek-Cypriots did not see a need for a rigid ethnic separation 
between the two communities. In other words, there was simply talk of two federal units, 
forming a Federal Republic. For the Turkish-Cypriots, a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation 
consisted of two strictly geographically and ethnically separated autonomous states, unified 
politically as a Federal Republic of Cyprus.167   
 
A major political step towards this goal was taken half a year before the completion of the 
separation of the two communities. On 13 February 1975, the Turkish-Cypriots proclaimed 
the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Denktaş, formerly the Vice President of the Turkish-
Cypriot community, became President of this newly proclaimed federated state. The 
international community, this time through the UN Security Council, unanimously 
condemned the development and reiterated that the Republic of Cyprus was the only 
recognized entity on the island.168 The proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus 
in 1975 was another major step towards the political independence of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, which had slowly begun with the establishment of the General Committee in 
1963 and developed through the formation of the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration 
in 1967, the Turkish-Cypriot Administration in 1971 and finally the Autonomous Turkish-
Cypriot Administration in 1974.169     
 
The Turkish-Cypriot efforts at increasing their independence, including the creation of a 
federal state in Cyprus, only made them more isolated internationally. As a result, they 
sought further support from Turkey, still the only country to recognize their political 
aspirations. This resulted in a more or less complete reliance on Turkey. Although the actions 	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of the Turkish-Cypriots after the completion of the Turkish intervention were internationally 
condemned, the Turkish-Cypriots were positive towards Turkey’s actions and viewed them 
as saving them from the harsh conditions under which they had lived in the enclaves 
throughout the 1963 to 1974-period.170 Safety from Greek-Cypriot violence was their primary 
concern. Turkey’s intervention meant they were now protected both by a UN buffer zone that 
cut across the island, and by a large Turkish army contingent stationed in the north.171  
 
The international community was very critical of Turkey’s actions in Cyprus. In response to 
the Turkish army’s continued presence in northern Cyprus, the United States implemented an 
arms embargo on Turkey, despite the fact that they were both NATO members. The 
American arms embargo lasted until 1978 and is a vivid illustration of the political isolation 
Turkey faced as a result of the 1974 intervention. The United States had, ten years earlier, in 
the Johnson Letter, made it clear that it would punish Turkey if it were to use American 
weapons in any prospective invasion of Cyprus. This spurred anti-American sentiments 
among both Turks and Turkish-Cypriots, who saw the international community’s reactions as 
unfair and one-sidedly in favor of the Greek-Cypriots.172 The presence of the Turkish army 
made the international community even more skeptical of the self-proclaimed Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus. The international community’s reaction to the role of the Turkish 
army in the north confined “the Turkish-Cypriot state-building ambitions to the establishment 
of a kind of huge enclave fully dependent on Ankara’s support.”173 It was assumed that 
Turkey stood behind every Turkish-Cypriot move towards increased independence. However, 
as may be seen by the development of Turkish-Cypriot political bodies prior to Turkey’s 
1974 intervention, the Turkish-Cypriots actively and independently moved towards 
sovereignty. The truth is therefore more nuanced. 
 
The political developments in northern Cyprus following the division of the island were, 
according to the historian Christoph Ramm, characterized by “the effort to create a kind of 
‘Little Turkey’, with the Turkish Cypriot administration attempting to shape the society of 
northern Cyprus according to the Turkish model”.174 The Kemalist ideology, based on 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s political efforts and views when he founded the new Turkish state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
171 Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 48; Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 186.  
172 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 196; Zürcher, Turkey, 276. See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
173 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 208. 
174 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 191-192. 
	   39	  
in 1923, was central to the Turkish model referred to by Ramm. It focused on the need to 
create a secular and ethno-nationalist state. Dentkaş declared the need to be devoted to the 
principles of pluralism and democracy. These became central aspects of the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus.175  
 
However, certain subjects were not to be open to neither pluralism nor democracy in the 
unrecognized state where Denktaş became President. The view on the Cyprus conflict and on 
the Greeks, the Greek-Cypriots and the outside world was regarded as issues central to “the 
preservation of ‘unity and togetherness’” and was therefore “a central element into the state’s 
foundations.”176 These restrictions on political views were outlined in the Law on Political 
Parties, which was adopted at the same time as the proposed constitution was unveiled in 
May 1975. All political parties in northern Cyprus were prohibited from discrediting Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk and his historical role in founding the Turkish Republic; refuting the cultural 
link between the Turkish-Cypriot community and the greater Turkish nation; and to criticize 
the Turkish intervention in 1974 and claim that it was illegal.177 It is clear, in light of these 
restrictions, especially the final point, that Turkey was an important model for northern 
Cypriot politics.  
 
Nevertheless, the Turkish President at the time, Fahri Korutürk, denied allegations that 
Turkey was behind all political developments in north Cyprus and claimed that “the new 
constitution was no more than an internal reorganization intended to ease movements towards 
a federal state in the course of time.”178 Vedat Çelik, Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs 
of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus at the time, held that Turkey did not intervene 
directly in the politics of north Cyprus, although it may have provided “suggestions and 
recommendations” to the Turkish-Cypriot administration.179 At the same time, he argued that 
“we were very, very careful not to associate ourselves, or identify ourselves with any political 
party in Turkey … It was the Turkish government [we] had the allegiance [to] … [we] 	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needed their support, full support in each and every sector”.180 This reveals the true nature of 
dependence and loyalty.  
 
While the Law on Political Parties had some questionable aspects undermining its democratic 
credibility, the discussions around the proposed constitution revealed that democracy was, in 
other questions and matters, an underlying principle. The constitution disclosed in May 1975 
received criticism from a large group of politicians in northern Cyprus. The main argument 
against the proposed constitution was that the President received too much power. In its 
initial draft it was proposed that the President could appoint and dismiss ministers at will. 
Furthermore, the President could take exceptional measures in any event he considered 
dangerous to the security of the state. Both of these points were harshly criticized. Whereas 
the first point was amended, the second was completely removed.181 These developments 
reveal that political participation was a growing phenomenon in north Cyprus following the 
division of the island. Nevertheless, certain aspects were not subject to discussion, namely 
the Cyprus conflict.182 Therefore, “opposition was mainly motivated … by constitutional, 
ideological, and policy differences related to the internal problems of Northern Cyprus.”183   
                                                                                                                                                   
On 8 June 1975 the constitution, with a more parliamentarian character and some important 
revisions made, was brought to a referendum. 99.4 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot electorate 
(with a 72 percent turn-out) voted in favor of the revised constitution.184 The constitution 
outlined that the Turkish Federated Republic of Cyprus was a republic, with the President as 
the Head of State. Under the President was a Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister as 
its head. Rather than being a proclamation of independence, the constitution of the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus underlined that once the Federal Republic of Cyprus was declared, 
it would make up the Turkish entity of this federation.185  
 
Prior to the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and the passing of the 
constitution, the only political party in northern Cyprus was the Republican Turkish Party 	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(Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi: CTP), founded in 1970. Ahmed Berberoğlu was the leader of the 
party until Özker Özgür became its new party leader in 1976. Both were critical of Denktaş’s 
clear domination in Turkish-Cypriot politics. Following the debates on the draft constitution 
in 1975, a series of new political parties were formed. The first new party, founded in August 
1975, was the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti: HP), which described itself as a social-democratic 
party. In reaction to the forming opposition to the ruling right-wing Turkish-Cypriot 
administration, Denktaş established the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi: UBP), 
which has been the most important and influential party in north Cyprus since its founding in 
October 1975. Early on, HP faced an internal dispute and lost many of its central members 
who broke out of the party and formed the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtuluş 
Partisi: TKP) in March 1976. This newly founded party became one of the central actors in 
the opposition against Denktaş and the UBP.186  
 
On 20 June 1976 both presidential and general elections were held in northern Cyprus. 
Denktaş achieved a clear victory in the presidential elections, receiving 77.6 percent of the 
votes. Meanwhile his party, the UBP, was the clear winner of the general election with 53.7 
percent of the votes. Receiving 20.2 percent of the votes, the TKP became the second biggest 
party.187 The TKP had undoubtedly hoped for and expected better election results. After all, 
the UBP leadership had been the ruling elite in the Turkish-Cypriot community since the 
division of the island. Moreover, the domestic situation in northern Cyprus was plagued by a 
troubled economy.188 
 
During UBP’s time in power, from 1976 to 1981, the party fielded three Prime Ministers.189 
Nejat Konuk’s cabinet faced “accusations of inefficiency and impropriety”, and the economic 
difficulties that characterized northern Cyprus challenged UBP’s popularity.190 Faced with 
opposition both from within and from outside the party, Konuk resigned in April 1978 and 
was succeeded by Osman Örek whose goal was to improve the economy, the Achilles heel of 
the UBP and northern Cyprus. Although the economic situation was somewhat improved 	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through increased trade with and aid from Turkey, the Örek government began to come apart 
at the seams through various cabinet resignations. In November 1978, only six months after 
becoming Prime Minister, Örek resigned. Mustafa Çağatay, Minister of Health in Örek’s 
cabinet, became the new Prime Minister. One of his first acts was to send a delegation to 
Turkey to obtain further economic support. In securing a bigger aid package, the Çağatay 
government was initially able to mollify criticism from the opposition, both within the UBP 
and from other parties. By using Turkish Lira, northern Cyprus linked itself closely to the 
Turkish economy, thus limiting their financial autonomy. Turkey’s economy deteriorated 
considerably during Çağatay’s period as Prime Minister. Coupled with the Turkish military 
coup on 12 September 1980, this caused repercussions in the economy in the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Çağatay’s government survived the crisis.191   
 
Despite the internal problems and difficulties that the UBP government faced, Denktaş 
distanced himself from everyday domestic politics of north Cyprus and was “quick to assert 
that government was not his responsibility”.192 The initial powers proposed for the president 
in the first constitution were removed through critical debates on the matter. Denktaş’s 
political role lay elsewhere, namely continuing to represent the Turkish-Cypriots in 
international talks on solving the Cyprus conflict.193 Çelik claimed that both he and Denktaş, 
as they were busy with negotiating on a solution to the conflict, “had no time whatsoever 
[for] … internal administrative problems” in this period.194   
 
The inter-communal negotiations 
Despite the small size of Cyprus, the conflict there received major international attention. 
Greece and Turkey were deeply involved due to the cultural ties between their respective 
ethnic brethren on the island. During the Cold War, both Britain, which until 1960 had 
Cyprus in their colonial possession, and the US took an increasing interest in the conflict 
because of the geopolitical position of the island. The UN had been involved in attempting to 
solve the Cyprus conflict ever since the civil war that started in 1963. In 1964, it set up an 
international peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, to prevent further violence.195 After the division 
of the island a series of new inter-communal negotiations were set in motion. They were 	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initiated both through encouragement from Britain, the US and the UN, but also through 
efforts made by both Denktaş, as the representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community, and 
Clerides, representing the Greek-Cypriots.196  
 
Denktaş and Clerides initiated negotiations during the last few months of 1974. They were 
able to make unprecedented progress in their negotiations on how to solve the conflict. On 6 
November 1974 Clerides noted that returning to the Cyprus of 1960 would not be realistic, 
mainly because Turkey would not approve of such a move. Therefore, he argued, a federal 
solution should be sought.197 This statement was warmly welcomed by the Turkish-Cypriots, 
and “Denktash called his attitude realistic and constructive.”198 Another hint at a possible 
success in the negotiations between Clerides and Denktaş was that the latter revealed a 
potential openness towards making territorial concessions. Nevertheless, he also stated that 
he would not hold talks with Makarios if he were to return to the island from his exile 
following the coup d’état. Makarios’ return, however, was imminent and therefore Clerides’ 
time as negotiator was running out. Most Greek-Cypriots regarded Makarios as a hero, 
because he had been the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus since 1950 and was Cyprus’ 
first President.199 The Greek-Cypriots were for the most part negative to Clerides’ approach 
because, they argued, he made too many concessions. The Greek-Cypriots were therefore 
pleased to find that Makarios, who they knew was going to take a tougher stance against the 
Turks and the Turkish-Cypriots, returned to the island on 7 December 1974.200  
 
The negotiations between the two parties were temporarily suspended as a result of 
Makarios’ return to Cyprus. Both Denktaş and Turkey refused to negotiate on Makarios’ 
terms, which he had stated on 22 November 1974 to be the total withdrawal of all Turkish 
forces and the return of Greek-Cypriot refugees to the north. Furthermore, Makarios was not 
willing to accept the Turkish-Cypriot desire for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, but could 
offer working towards a multi-regional federation.201 Whereas a bi-zonal federation implied 
two ethnically and geographically separated areas, a multi-regional federation was not 
acceptable to the Turkish-Cypriots as it meant creating a series of disconnected Turkish-
Cypriot islands in a larger Greek-Cypriot sea, which evoked memories of the enclaves of the 	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1960s and 1970s. The Turkish-Cypriots could not accept such a solution as their security and 
safety from inter-communal violence was their primary concern. Such security would be 
harder to ensure with disconnected zones. Despite these disagreements, the two parties came 
together in April 1975. They were encouraged to do so by the United Nations Secretary-
General at the time, Kurt Waldheim. It culminated in the High Level Agreement of 1977.202  
                                                                                                                                                 
One of the clichés of the Cyprus conflict is the notion of missed opportunities. The inter-
communal negotiations are a clear example. The High Level Agreements reached between 
Denktaş and Makarios in 1977, were similar to the principles discussed three years earlier 
between Denktaş and Clerides. However, the High Level Agreements were more 
comprehensive and, more importantly, agreed to by all.203 These agreements were the biggest 
breakthroughs in moving towards a solution to the Cyprus conflict, and “until today it is the 
basic feature of all solution proposals.”204 The principles agreed to between Makarios and 
Denktaş in February 1977 were the following: 
1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic. 
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of 
economic viability or productivity and land ownership. 
3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property 
and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental 
basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the 
Turkish Cypriot Community. 
4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the 
unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.205 
 
Clearly, these four points were solely a framework for how any future solution should be 
carried out. Moreover, the points were all quite ambiguous, particularly points 1 and 2, which 
represent the more recurrent areas of contention between the two communities. The Turkish-
Cypriots, for instance, desire two separated entities with great restrictions on migration 
between the two areas.206 This is first and foremost suggested as a form of security for the 
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Turkish-Cypriot minority, but also “in order to preserve the homogeneity of the units”.207 
However, this notion of homogeneity is somewhat obscured when analyzing the immigration 
of people from mainland Turkey in the period 1974-1980, as they were of various ethnic and 
religious backgrounds.208 The Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, view the principles of the 
freedom of movement, settlement and property as central to accepting any solution.209 A 
major breakthrough with the 1977 agreements, however, was that Makarios reversed his 
initial stance of rejecting a bi-zonal federal solution, which he had held onto ever since 
negotiations had started. Another major point of disagreement was that of the economy in any 
future federal solution.210 In the Turkish-Cypriot view, the economies of the two 
communities should remain separated “until the economic gap between the two Cypriot 
communities … is removed and confidence is restored between them”.211  
 
For these reasons, among others, the High Level Agreements reached between Denktaş and 
Makarios in February 1977 did not lead to anything more than an ambiguous, normative list 
of guidelines for what any future solution should look like. When Makarios died suddenly on 
3 August 1977, Spyros Kyprianou became acting president in the Republic of Cyprus, and 
thereafter represented the Greek-Cypriots in the talks.212  
 
Despite the change of guard in the Greek-Cypriot leadership, no major breakthroughs 
followed between the two parties. UN Secretary-General Waldheim was able to bring 
Kyprianou and Denktaş together for renewed negotiations in May 1979, which resulted in a 
ten-point agreement. The agreement, however, barely contained anything new compared to 
the High Level Agreements in 1977. Most of the points simply reiterated the need for 
continued talks. Nevertheless, some important subjects were added: first, the issue of Maraş, 
an abandoned, ghost-like suburb of Gazi Mağusa in northern Cyprus, was to be prioritized in 
future talks so that a large group of Greek-Cypriot refugees could promptly return; and 
second, Cyprus should be completely demilitarized so as to extinguish the Turkish-Cypriot 
fear for their safety and prevent the union with another state or outright secession.213 Despite 	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the agreement, further talks on 15 June 1979 quickly broke down. The political and physical 
division of the island continued and deepened.214 One major point that was left out of the 
inter-communal discussions altogether: The issue of the Turkish immigrants who had moved, 
and continued to move, to northern Cyprus following the Turkish intervention in 1974.215  
 
Social changes 
The political and cultural ties to and influences from Turkey strengthened the popular view 
that Turkey was in control of and had responsibility for every action and move taken by the 
Turkish-Cypriots towards increased independence. Nevertheless, many of the Turkish 
principles of which the self-proclaimed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was based on, 
such as secularism, were already central to the Turkish-Cypriot community. An effect of the 
British colonial period from 1878 to 1960 had been the reduced role of religion in Cyprus, 
especially among the Turkish-Cypriots.216 As for ethno-nationalism, many Turkish-Cypriots 
had since the mid-1950s viewed themselves as a part of the Turkish nation, as Turks of 
Cyprus.217 For them, the post-1974 situation was viewed as “the fulfillment of their old 
dreams of cultural reunification with the Anatolian ‘motherland’ and the world of 
Turkishness.”218 The constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus specifies that the 
“Turkish Cypriot Community is an inseparable part of the Great Turkish Nation”.219 
 
The increasing presence of immigrants from mainland Turkey augmented the sense, outside 
the north, that Turkey was colonializing northern Cyprus. The Greek political scientist 
Christos P. Ioannides, for instance, argues that the immigration from Turkey caused a 
“cultural transformation of the occupied territory of Cyprus into a province of Turkey.”220 He 
also argues, based on the knowledge that an increasing number of churches in northern 
Cyprus were converted into mosques, that the north was being Islamized.221 Ramm counters 
this view by claiming that “the practice of converting Orthodox churches into mosques … 
was less religiously motivated than it symbolized the claim to ethnic Turkish cultural 
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hegemony over the north.”222 Turkish-Cypriots were largely quite secular, and despite the 
increased number of mosques in northern Cyprus after the division of the island, few attend 
prayer in the mosques on a regular basis.223 However, the majority of the immigrants who 
arrived in north Cyprus after 1974 were farmers from Central-, Southern- and Eastern-
Anatolia, and the Black Sea region of Turkey. These areas were more traditional and 
religious.224 Despite the influx of more religious immigrants and the fact that numerous 
Imams, salaried by the Turkish government, were sent to Cyprus from Turkey, there is little 
evidence that northern Cyprus overall became more religious in the period 1974-1980.225 The 
Greek-Cypriots’ notion of the social changes brought to north Cyprus with the Turkish 
immigration, and their consequent political attitude towards the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus, was largely shaped by the adaption of preordained perceptions, as Professor Robert 
Jervis would argue, of the Turkish-Cypriots and their self-proclaimed federated state.226    
 
Another area of social change in northern Cyprus in this period was the Turkish-Cypriot 
policy “to remove many Greek elements of the pre-1974 cultural landscape from the now 
Turkish Cypriot territory”.227 For the most part this involved changing place names from their 
original Greek names into Turkish ones. There were three categories of village-(re)naming: 
one, villages that were already culturally Turkish-Cypriot, and had Turkish names, were not 
renamed; two, villages that had both a Greek and a Turkish name prior to 1974 either took on 
solely the Turkish name or was completely renamed; three, villages that were entirely Greek-
Cypriot before 1974, and therefore only had Greek names, were resettled by both Turkish-
Cypriot refugees from the south and immigrants from Turkey, and were renamed 
altogether.228 The goal of this policy was to do away with “Greekness, where it was 
symbolised in place-names” in northern Cyprus.229 Greek names of towns and villages were 
removed from maps and signs, resulting in an eradication of Greek culture and language. The 
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only exception being the Karpassia Peninsula, where the few remaining Greek-Cypriots have 
upheld Greek elements.230   
 
Renaming villages, in addition to the aforementioned practice of turning churches into 
mosques, was a part of the desire to “Turkify” the north and create “an ‘ethnic democracy’ 
only for Turks.”231 Furthermore, it was part of the policy of achieving cultural and political 
independence from the Greek-Cypriots. Another means to reaching this goal was the removal 
and eradication of symbols and elements of Greek and Greek-Cypriot culture and history, 
replacing them with Turkish ones, such as statues of Kemal Atatürk.232 These policies appear 
to have been steps towards creating a wholly independent Turkish-Cypriot state, rather than a 
Federal Cypriot Republic. “The main strategy of Turkification was to convince the newcomer 
Turks from Turkey … and the Turkish Cypriots … that this is a Turkish place, both in the 
present and for a future that is detached from the past.”233 Cyprus was being transformed into 
two geographically and culturally separated parts.234 
 
Economic developments 
The area in which the developments in northern Cyprus were mostly controlled and 
influenced by Turkey was that of the economy. During the civil war period of 1963-1974, the 
Turkish-Cypriots mainly lived in enclaves out of reach of the Cyprus government and were 
therefore hardly involved in the politics and economy of the state. Their main concerns were 
security and providing for basic needs. The length of the period in which they were absent 
from government meant that they were to a large extent inexperienced in the fields of public 
and economic management.235 Therefore, although in control of fertile and agriculturally 
opportune areas after the Turkish intervention in 1974, “the Turkish Cypriots had to start 
from very little when Northern Cyprus claimed its own boundaries and identity and installed 
its own government”.236  	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In addition to inexperience, the Turkish-Cypriots were unable to become politically 
recognized internationally. They faced political and economic boycotts from abroad. This 
played a big role in making the situation in north Cyprus difficult. Moreover, many of the 
sectors of the northern Cypriot economy were underemployed due to the population vacuum 
created by the forced exodus of circa 180,000 Greek-Cypriots. Further, the economic 
situation was characterized by high inflation rates, rising cost of living and labor unrest.237 
According to Hakkı Atun, north Cyprus’ first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, there 
were three main economic objectives for the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in this period, 
namely “to direct the economy, to make best use of the idle factors of production, [and] to 
prepare the way to planned economy.”238 Turkey attempted to save the damaged northern 
Cypriot economy by contributing to funding the budget, giving aid and sending experts and 
not least immigrants, who could fill the thin workforce.239  
 
Approximately 33 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot budget came from Turkey.240 This has led 
some, such as Ioannides, to argue that “[i]n the economic realm, Turkey dictates the policy to 
be followed” by the Turkish-Cypriots.241 This assessment is to a great extent correct. Dr. 
Erdal Onurhan was directly involved in this process, and asserts that “there were several 
public enterprises formed right after 1974” in order to get the economy running.242 There 
were public enterprises for the major production areas of the northern Cypriot economy: 
industry (Sanayi Holding), shipping and airfreight, and citrus (Cypruvex). Initially, 52 
percent of the shares of these companies were owned by the Turkish-Cypriot government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 201; Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 111-112; 
Gökeri, “Economic Development in T.R.N.C. Since 1975” in Cyprus Turkish-German Cultural Association, 
Structural Changes in the Economy of North Cyprus. Gazi Mağusa: Eastern Mediterranean University, 1990: 
50-55, 51. Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 1564; State Planning Organization, Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, “Economic Developments in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” Lefkoşa: Prime 
Ministry State Planning Organization, 1990, 13, 15. Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National 
Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 905. 
238 Atun, Hakkı, “Report of Proceedings on Resources & Development in North Cyprus”, 103-104. Source 
found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 89. 
239 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 207; Interview with Atakol; Interview with Çelik; Interview 
with Atun; Author’s private interview with Dr. Erdal Onurhan at Middle East Technical University Northern 
Cyprus Campus in Kalkanlı, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 18 April 2013.. See chapter 5 
of this thesis. 
240 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 117. 
241 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 186. 
242 Interview with Onurhan. 
	  50	  
while the remaining belonged to Turkish public enterprises within the same field of 
production.243  
 
In 1974 the Turkish-Cypriots adopted the Turkish Lira as their legal tender, and with it came 
the high Turkish inflation that characterized the Turkish economy of the 1970s.244 
Furthermore, Turkey, despite having been underdeveloped in most regions, subsidized the 
northern Cypriot economy.245 One must view this in light of the international community’s 
and the Greek-Cypriot embargo of north Cyprus, economically and politically. In addition to 
the lack of international recognition, northern Cyprus, being recognized only by Turkey, 
experienced slower economic development than Southern Cyprus. North Cyprus was only 
half as productive overall as the Greek-Cypriot side and, within the agricultural sector, only 
30 percent as productive. Furthermore, the average Turkish-Cypriot earned about one fourth 
as much as a Greek-Cypriot.246  
 
How can these discrepancies and inequalities be explained? While both Turkey and the 
Turkish-Cypriot administration claimed that it was wholly because of the embargo, the 
Greek-Cypriots pointed towards “bad management, lack of investment and corruption” in 
northern Cyprus.247 It was, for instance, paradoxical that even with the agricultural potential 
of north Cyprus, they were to a large extent dependent on imported food from Turkey. The 
Greek-Cypriot authorities tend to claim that “70-80% of the economic resources of Cyprus 
are in the area of the Turkish Federated State”.248 The President of the Supreme Court of the 
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus at the time, M. Necati Münir Ertekün, on the other hand, 
submits the following numbers: roughly 18 percent of the water resources; 30 percent of the 
agricultural productive land; two percent of the minerals; and two percent of the productive 
forests.249 While the former estimates exaggerated the percentage of economic resources in 
Turkish-Cypriot possession following the island’s division, Ertekün underestimates. The truth 
is likely found somewhere on the lower end of the medium between these numbers. The point 	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is that despite having resource potential, northern Cyprus’ economic development was slow. 
The reasons for this discrepancy is probably due to both inefficient policies, however, it may 
also be explained by lack of international recognition and the consequent embargo.    
 
One of the reasons for the need to import food was that only about 68 percent of the farmland 
in northern Cyprus was used, the rest remained fallow. Furthermore, many of those who 
migrated to the north from Turkey were not adequately suited to farming the new land they 
moved to.250 This was due to differing conditions compared to those where they came from. 
Denktaş blamed the Turkish government “for an arbitrary selection of labourers from 
Anatolia”.251 Thus, the poor economic development of northern Cyprus was a result of 
lacking recognition and therein being embargoed, but also for unwise and inefficient policies. 
 
The immigration of mainland Turks to northern Cyprus must be seen as a result of Turkish-
Cypriot reliance on Turkey after the intervention in 1974. The economist Mustafa Ergün 
Olgun notes that “[t]he smaller and more isolated … a country is, the more it drives towards 
further co-operation and integration with a friendly regional power”.252 Northern Cyprus was 
certainly both a small and an isolated entity, and its relationship with Turkey has since 1974 
been characterized by close cooperation in both economic, social and political terms. This, in 
addition to a dire need of labor, particularly within agriculture, is the context in which the 
first wave of immigration from Turkey took place. The political, social and economic 
situation in Turkey in this period also meant that it was seen, by many, as opportune to 
migrate to north Cyprus. 
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4. Turkey 1974-1980: Emigration in a 
Context of Economic, Political and Social 
Crisis 
 
The situation in Turkey during the 1970s and early 1980s was characterized by political and 
social turmoil. Furthermore, Turkey was marked by an economic crisis, approaching total 
economic collapse. These elements resulted in widespread violence, at times reminiscent of a 
civil war. The violence was religious and political in nature. In this period, also ethnicity 
became an increasingly important element in Turks’ identity, creating a great potential for 
social turmoil. None of the governments in Ankara were able to sufficiently deal with 
politically and ethnically motivated violence and the economic crisis.253 These internal 
changes led to migration both within Turkey, and labor migration to Western Europe. Parallel 
to these developments, the situation in northern Cyprus, after the Turkish intervention of 
1974, created a need for labor from Turkey. Why did people migrate from Turkey in this 
period? What role did the Turkish government have in this process? 
 
Political instability in the 1970s 
In January 1974, Bülent Ecevit had formed a weak coalition government between his 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: CHP) and the National Salvation Party 
(Millî Selâmet Partisi: MSP). But Prime Minister Ecevit was seen as a national hero after his 
successful intervention in Cyprus in July and August of the same year. Seeking a stronger 
and more stable government, he resigned on 18 November 1974 and called for early 
elections, hoping, and believing, that his success in Cyprus would lead to a swift electoral 
victory. Presumably he would have won through a landslide, such was the extent of his status 
as a national hero for the Turks.254  
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However, the right-wing political parties in Turkey refused to allow early elections. They 
were determined to avoid a strong CHP government led by Ecevit. It was therefore suggested 
that CHP and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi: AP) could form a coalition. But Süleyman 
Demirel, leader of AP, refused to join such an alliance. In place of elections, Demirel formed 
a new coalition government, the Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe), in March 1975. This 
was a coalition government made up of four parties on the right: the Justice Party, the 
National Salvation Party, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: MHP) and 
the Republican Trust Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi: CGP). The MHP was by many seen 
as a neo-fascist party, whose paramilitary arm, the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar), became 
increasingly involved in the violence that plagued Turkey from the mid-1970s. The leader of 
the MHP, Alpaslan Türkeş, became the Minister of State in this government.255 He 
reorganized the ministry, and consequently “the police and security forces became 
thoroughly infiltrated by neo-fascists loyal to Türkeş.”256 Thus started the political violence 
between left and right that became one of the main characteristics of 1970s Turkey.  
 
The National Front coalition and the neo-fascist elements prevalent within the government, 
particularly in the police and security forces, became an increasing embarrassment to 
Demirel, whose coalition was harshly criticized by the liberal press in the country. In April 
1977 he therefore decided to hold elections in the summer. In times of crisis, such as the one 
Turkey faced in this period, voters normally neglect the smaller parties. The 1977 election 
was a good example of this trend. Turkey seemed to enter a period characterized by a two-
party system consisting of a large CHP and a large AP.257  
 
Leading to the election, Turkey entered an excessively violent period, with May Day 1977 as 
a climax.258 In response to the increase of political violence, carried out mainly by neo-fascist 
elements, the left organized a demonstration on Taksim Square in Istanbul on 1 May “as a 
show of strength against what it described as ‘the rising tide of fascism’.”259 The rightist 
paramilitary groups answered the protests with an outright attack on the demonstrators, 
resulting in the death of 34 people. This show of strength from the right did not, however, 
intimidate people from participating in the 1977 election, which saw a nearly four percent 	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increase in voter turnout from the election of 1973. Although Ecevit and the CHP won the 
election with 41.4 percent, they were 13 seats in parliament short of being able to form a 
majority government. Ecevit thus attempted to form a minority government, but did not 
receive the needed vote of confidence from the parliament. As a result, Demirel formed a 
new National Front coalition on 21 July. However, the second National Front government 
was unable to survive after local elections in December 1977, and on 31 December they 
received a vote of no confidence, and the cabinet was disbanded.260 
 
In January 1978 Ecevit again formed a government consisting of CHP members and 
independents. The independents were mainly former AP members who had broken out in 
response to Demirel’s National Front coalitions. This government was, similarly to every 
government between 1973 and 1980, both weak and short-lived. The political violence and 
troubled economic situation Turkey found itself in resulted in yet another government being 
disbanded in October 1979. The by-elections of October 1979 revealed a steep decline in 
support for CHP and a sharp increase for AP. As a result, Demirel again came to power, this 
time with a coalition of AP members and independents, without the controversial MHP. 
Ecevit and his party had clearly lost the influence and popularity they had gained after the 
successful intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Demirel and the AP, however, were not victors in 
the Turkish political scene either. On 12 September 1980, the military resumed power in the 
third military coup in two decades. The military had already in 1979 hinted at the need to 
carry out a coup due to the pressing issues of the economy and not least the civil war-like 
conditions throughout Turkey.261 
 
The combination of “[l]egitimacy crisis, economic crisis and crisis of the political system 
were all acting together by the end of the 1970s, feeding into a deadlock in the country.”262 
There were, according to professor William Hale, two reasons for the collapse that led to the 
12 September 1980 coup in Turkey: “a mounting economic crisis and … a catastrophic 
decline in law and order”.263 At the same time, however, from the 1960s through the 1970s, 
Turkey went through some important, positive developments. For instance, the Gross 
National Product (GNP), which represents the total production of services and products in a 	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country in a year, grew on average 4.3 percent from 1963 to 1977. In addition, Turkey 
climbed on the Human Development Index (HDI) scale in the same period. HDI combines 
education levels, literacy rates, life expectancy rates and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
person to generate a score between zero and one (zero being the lowest, one being the 
highest). Nevertheless, Turkey was plagued by large regional inequalities, which retarded 
development in certain areas. The regional differences were a result of incorrect policies and 
differences in human and natural resources within Turkey.264 
 
Economic and social turmoil 
Turkey was in a deep crisis during the 1970s. One of the major reasons for this instability 
was the economic crisis that characterized Turkey during the same period. The troubled 
economy in Turkey was in turn largely due to the oil crisis that hit the world after the Yom 
Kippur War in the Middle East in 1973. Another factor negatively influencing the Turkish 
economy was the Cyprus intervention of 1974. In addition to the immense costs involved in 
the two interventions of July and August, Turkey had to continually use a lot of resources in 
aiding the Turkish-Cypriots, politically, militarily and economically. They were deeply 
involved in the construction of a Turkish-Cypriot northern Cyprus, and much of the latter’s 
state budget came directly from Turkey.265 Furthermore, the United States suspended their 
military assistance to Turkey in response to the interventions.266 All of these factors had a 
negative effect on the Turkish economy. However, it was not only outside factors that hit 
Turkey’s economy hard.  
                                                                                                                                                 
The Turkey of the 1960s had witnessed economic growth and a significant increase in its 
HDI score in 1975. These decades were also marked by “major infrastructural projects, 
especially the construction of highways and dams.”267 Nevertheless, the GDP per capita did 
not grow significantly. This was mainly due to regional inequalities, but also in large part due 
to the population growth, which averaged around 2.4 percent in the same period. Parallel to 
this population growth, there was an immense increase in the urban population, which led to 
both social and economic unrest in the main cities. Both Ankara and Istanbul grew 	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immensely between 1950 and 1980, increasing their populations by over two and three 
million respectively. This urban growth was obviously coupled with a move away from the 
countryside. In fact, the percentage of the rural population in Turkey was less than 50 percent 
by the mid-1980s. This migration away from the countryside may largely be explained by the 
increased use of machinery in agriculture, such as the employment of fertilizers and tractors. 
In addition to the increase in people moving from the countryside to the cities within Turkey, 
there was a vast increase in labor emigration to other countries, primarily Germany.268 This 
was due both to a need for labor in those countries and the obvious sense of opportunity for 
the Turkish immigrants. For the same reasons, moving to northern Cyprus was also seen as 
favorable for some. While there was a decreasing need for agricultural labor in the Turkish 
rural areas, there was an increasing need for such labor in north Cyprus.269    
                                                                                                                                          
Inflation rates increased notably during the same period and reached a staggering 90 percent 
in 1979. This rise in inflation devalued workers’ salaries, making it harder to survive on their 
wages. Furthermore, unemployment rates grew, from an already high level, considerably 
during the 1970s. By 1977, the number of unemployed officially stood at 1.5 million, an 
increase of nearly one million since 1967. University and high school students therefore had 
few opportunities once they had finished their education, a source of great frustration among 
Turkey’s youth. This may be seen as a major source of the political violence that plagued 
Turkey in the 1970s. Moreover, these factors led many to realize the value of moving 
elsewhere in an attempt to better their lives.270 
 
In addition to the troubled economic situation, causing political left-right confrontation, 
social factors increased the degree of ethnicity as an identity marker in Turkey. Ethnic and 
religious differences were engaged during this period and, together with the economic 
hardships many experienced, formed an explosive mixture. These ethnic and religious 
differences were not entirely new. Most had existed since Ottoman times. As a result of the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire, the size of the different ethnic and religious populations had 
diminished. Nevertheless, there were still a significant number of different ethnic and 
religious groups in the Turkish Republic. There were certain regions of Turkey in which 	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Turkish was not the dominant language.271 Historically, the Kurds were “categorized on the 
basis of ethnicity and not religion. Even though [they comprised of] … Muslim and non-
Muslim segments” and spoke another language.272 Kurdish was not the only other language 
that was prevalent in certain regions. Immigrants from the Balkans, North Caucasus and 
Crimea, who spoke other languages than Turkish, were predominant in some provinces. In 
addition to ethnic and language differences, there were religious divisions, particularly 
between Sunni and Alevi. These different groups took an increased stance on the left-right 
spectrum in the 1970s and 1980s. This led to a reinforced ethnic and religious dichotomy, 
which in turn resulted in a combination of political and ethnic violence.273  
 
The Alevi community is a good example in this regard. In the Ottoman Empire they were 
“disdained by both Sunnis and Shi’is” and became “the largest religious minority in the 
Turkish republic”.274 Historically, they were oppressed by the Sunni Ottoman administration 
and were therefore generally supporters of secularism and the political left. As this period 
was characterized by an upsurge in violence between the left and the right, the Alevi 
community was also affected. They were for instance the primary victims of the massacres in 
Kahramanmaraş, in Southeastern Anatolia, in 1978 and Çorum, in the West Black Sea sub-
region, in 1980, which combined left around 130 dead and many others injured. In addition to 
this religious-cum-political conflict line illustrated by the Alevi example, there was a 
religious-cum-linguistic-cum-political divide between a large Kurdish minority and the 
Turkish majority that increasingly became visible. In some areas of the country, mainly in 
Eastern Anatolia, local militias claimed land along ethnic or religious lines, and often 
undertook the role of the local government. Within the ethnic groups there were also political 
conflicts, for instance between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan: 
PKK) and the National Liberators of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçulari: KUK). 
These conflicts were also brought to the bigger cities through migration.275 
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In the outskirts of the three biggest cities in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, shantytowns 
were being set up by the vast influx of migrants, who had left the countryside in search for 
work. These shantytowns were vernacularly called gecekondu, literally meaning built at 
night, an illustration of the haste with which they were constructed. Characteristic of these 
neighborhoods, therefore, was that they lacked basic infrastructure such as a sewage system, 
water supply and electricity. As a result, they initially became small entities where the 
migrants took on roles normally handled by the government. The migrants set up their own 
communities within these shantytowns, usually in accordance with where they originally 
came from. People from the same villages settled in the same areas. In that way the 
shantytowns were an extension of their Anatolia villages.276  
 
Therefore, the political, ethnic or religious conflicts that had affected their lives in the 
countryside were imported into these shantytowns. Another element of frustration, leading to 
further political violence in the cities, was that few of those moving to the cities were able to 
find work in the industrial sector. Many had to take on irregular and part-time jobs as street 
vendors and the like. Moreover, a system of social security was not yet thoroughly developed 
in Turkey. Over half of the working population in Turkey did not have any social security at 
all. Within the industrial sector, roughly 70 percent of the workforce had social security.277 
All of these factors contributed to the growing political violence that plagued Turkey in this 
period and led to many desiring a move to somewhere else, for instance north Cyprus. 
                                                                                                                                              
While there was increased violence in the urban centers as a result of the population 
explosion that the cities experienced, the areas that were mostly affected by political violence 
were non-urban. The most troubled areas of Turkey were the Mediterranean, Southeastern 
Anatolian and Eastern Anatolian regions, in large part corresponding with the areas most of 
the migrants to northern Cyprus came from. While Western Turkey experienced a somewhat 
economic resurgence, these areas in Anatolia were poor and underdeveloped. Turkey was 
characterized by regional inequalities so vast that they retarded the economy overall. 
Southeastern Turkey, for instance, faced the lowest literacy rates, with the greatest literacy 
gender gap. Furthermore, it was characterized by the highest birthrates. Economic 
difficulties, coupled with ethnic contentions, particularly between Kurds and Turks, made 
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Eastern Anatolia a powder keg for social and political unrest.278 It is, therefore, no 
consequence that the majority of migrants to north Cyprus came from these regions of 
Turkey.   
 
Turkey and population movements 
Turkey was not unfamiliar with population exchanges and population movements. Since 
towards the end of the Ottoman Empire and well into the construction of the Turkish 
Republic, there were widespread population movements and exchanges of various ethnic and 
religious groups. After the Treaty of Lausanne, concluded in 1923, Greece and the newborn 
Turkish Republic exchanged some 1.5 million people. This exchange consisted of 
approximately 500,000 Muslims who moved from Greek territories to the newborn Turkish 
Republic, and circa one million Christians moving in the opposite direction.279 Furthermore, 
as part of a policy to “Turkify” the Kurds of Turkey, the Turkish Republic, beginning in the 
1930s and continuing well into the 1990s, often moved Kurds from mainly Kurdish areas of 
Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia to areas where fewer Kurds resided. Moreover, Yörük 
tribes, a semi-nomadic people mainly living in the Mediterranean region of Turkey, had been 
relocated within the empire throughout the Ottoman period.280  
 
Hakkı Atun, north Cyprus’ first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, stated that Turkey 
was an invaluable resource in the process of encouraging people from Turkey to migrate to 
northern Cyprus, as “[t]hey had a great experience in this matter because of the problems that 
they went through after the [1919-1923] independence war. And they always had to resettle 
people from trouble areas: From dam areas, from forest areas”.281 Thus Turkey had a lot of 
experience in this regard, and was a useful and competent expert for north Cyprus in the 
immigration process and the construction of a Turkish-Cypriot northern Cyprus.  
 
Migration from Turkey  
The large majority of the migrants who went to north Cyprus in the first wave of immigration 
were from the Trabzon province in the East Black Sea sub-region; the Samsun province of 	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the West Black Sea sub-region; the Konya province of the Central Anatolia region; the 
Adana, Antalya and Mersin provinces of the Mediterranean region; the Diyarbakır province 
of the Southeastern Anatolian region; and the Muş province of the Eastern Anatolian region 
(see Map 2 below).282 This coincides with where the bulk of both those who migrated came 
from, both within Turkey, and those who moved abroad. Moreover, the ethnic make-up of the 
Turkish immigrants was heterogeneous. They were of many different backgrounds: Turkish; 
Yörük; Laz, a people from the East Black Sea sub-region; and Kurdish were among the most 
common ethnic and linguistic groups in the first wave of immigration. 283  
	  
Map 2: Provinces from which the majority of immigrants from Turkey migrated.284  
	  
The British journalist Christopher Hitchens claimed “the immigrants were of a rather motley 
sort – unwanted in their places of origin, often with criminal records”.285 There is no proof 
that the Turkish immigrants in this period were criminals, while there may, of course, be 
minor cases in which that was true. At large, those who migrated to northern Cyprus were 	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normal, disadvantaged people seeking to improve their lives. The large majority of those who 
left Turkey for north Cyprus “opted to abandon their villages in Anatolia for economic 
reasons, not ideological ones.”286 None of those interviewed cite ideological conviction as the 
main reason for migrating to northern Cyprus. Yusuf Suiçmez who migrated in 1975 from 
Dağardı, Beşköy, in the Trabzon province, claimed that they had heard of the situation on the 
island in 1974 on the radio, and that they thought “it was [a] Turkish country and [that] the 
Greeks … attacked the Turks there and so we were going to help them”.287 Nevertheless, both 
he and his brothers, Musa and Halil, held that the lack of work opportunities and consequent 
economic difficulties in Turkey were the main reason for leaving the country and migrating 
to north Cyprus.288                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                 
The migrants were, for the most part, disadvantaged laborers or farmers mainly from areas of 
Turkey in which there were few work opportunities or where entire villages and towns were 
being uprooted due to large development projects, such as the construction of major dams or 
highways. In these cases the inhabitants of such places were informed of the imminent 
destruction of their houses and were told to apply for relocation.289 Atun, for instance, refers 
to the immigrants from Turkey as “the refugees that came from Anatolia” due to the 
unfavorable conditions they left.290 This was a common practice in 1970s Turkey because of 
these large economic development projects, which were seen as a way of improving the 
fragile Turkish economy. Naturally, it often took a long time for resettlement applications to 
be handled. However, once Cyprus was divided and the opportunity to move those in need of 
resettlement to northern Cyprus opened up, many applicants could finally start new lives 
there. Ali Kemalkürt and his family, after having applied for resettlement 10 to 15 years prior 
to the 1974 intervention, eventually resettled in north Cyprus in 1975.291   
 
The Kemalkürt family’s village in the Trabzon province of the East Black Sea sub-region 
was in danger of being destroyed by landslides. Nearby villages had been ravaged by 	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landslides, and many inhabitants, both in the neighboring villages and in Kemalkürt’s village, 
had been settled elsewhere: Some in the Hatay province, in Southeast-Anatolia; some in the 
Van province, in Eastern Anatolia; and others on Gökçeada Island, in the Aegean Sea.292 
After 1974, however, new opportunities arose in north Cyprus. Therefore, while earlier the 
households that were uprooted due to such projects in Turkey were moved to new locations 
within Turkey, often without many chances of finding new work or obtaining decent housing, 
land and houses were freed up in northern Cyprus and available for many of these families. It 
is therefore wrong to assert that Turkey chose people to come to north Cyprus willy-nilly, as 
Hitchens and other critics of the process allege.  
 
The Çakır family who moved from Yıldızlı, a village near Trabzon, in the eastern Black Sea 
region of Turkey, explains that the Turkish authorities “didn’t send a call to every village, 
they usually sent to the villages … in need”.293 That is, inhabitants of villages that were 
affected by either man-made destruction, such as the construction of dams, or natural 
destruction, such as landslides, as in their case, were asked to leave. The Turkish government 
specifically chose people from areas that were going to be used for large projects such as 
deforestation or the redirection of major rivers, waterfalls and other waterways.294 This 
practice of relocating families in Turkey in need, seemed to be the common denominator. It 
applied to most of the families that were interviewed, who were either affected by natural or 
man-made destruction of their homes or villages.  
 
The majority of those who were chosen for migration to north Cyprus were victims of the 
developmental projects that were occurring across Turkey at the time. However, villages with 
limited work opportunities, where the inhabitants mainly lived hand-to-mouth, were also 
often selected for potential migration. Kadir Yel, who migrated from near Kozan, in the 
Adana province of Turkey, to northern Cyprus with his family in 1976, told of difficult living 
conditions in his hometown. His father worked with mining, and it is fair to assume that their 
lives were difficult. In cases such as these, some people were particularly selected and 
promised housing and land in north Cyprus in order to encourage people to migrate.295 
Imams, village elders and others with authority and a high standing within the community, 	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were specifically picked out for such purposes. Suiçmez recounted that those who were 
“controlling and managing all this immigration process … pursued him [my father] … he 
was an imam there, an influential man, so he also motivated people to immigrate.”296 35 out 
of 300 families from Suiçmez’s village migrated to northern Cyprus in the first wave of 
immigration. The proportionately large number of families who migrated to north Cyprus 
from this particular village may be attributed to the influence of the imam and the 
legitimizing effect he likely had. These were not villages in danger of being destroyed as a 
result of landslides, deforestation or dam construction. On the other hand, there were few 
work and economic opportunities, and it was likely perceived that northern Cyprus would be 
a considerable improvement.297 In the words of Kemalkürt: “the life [in Turkey], the 
conditions [in Turkey], brought us here [to north Cyprus]”.298  
 
The expectations were obviously not always fulfilled. Many of the immigrants, and some 
officials, interviewed, remembered some families from their villages returning back to 
Turkey because their experiences in northern Cyprus did not reflect their expectations, or 
what they claimed they were promised by the authorities.299 Yusuf Suiçmez claimed that a 
person from his village in Turkey, who moved to north Cyprus at the same time as the 
Suiçmez family, returned to Turkey and “killed the kaymakam [the governor of the provincial 
district]” because “they lied to them” about what would await them in northern Cyprus.300 
Many myths surrounded the expectations of north Cyprus and the opportunities such a move 
would present. Many were in turn disappointed. The Çakır family, for instance, were told that 
Cyprus was “a paradise”.301 They were told that the crop yield would be more favorable in 
Cyprus than in Turkey and that the size of the fruit and vegetable would be considerably 
larger on the island. When they came to the island, however, many found that the weather 
conditions, marked by high temperatures and scarce rain, were harsh and less favorable for 
agriculture.302  
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The combination of such expectations, myths and influential people encouraging 
resettlement, together with a lack of opportunities in Turkey, likely led such a proportionately 
large number of migrants to decide to move to northern Cyprus in the first wave of 
immigration. McGarry argues that push and pull factors may be created or exaggerated by 
political authorities in order to encourage a desired migration.303 This certainly seems to be 
the case here. Calls were made over the radio, through the muhtars (the village head), 
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ consulates, and/or visiting government officials for labor, 
agricultural and otherwise. Moreover, in line with McGarry’s theory, they were promised free 
housing and land in north Cyprus.304 
 
Although Turkey was plagued by ethnic and political violence during the period of the first 
wave of migration to northern Cyprus, there is little indication that “enemies”, in the way 
McGarry applies the term, were sent to north Cyprus.305 It may be true that the Turkish 
authorities traditionally saw both Yörüks and Kurds as a state liability, the former because of 
their nomadism.306 The latter due to their, in the eyes of successive Turkish governments, un-
Turkishness, with “strong tribal affiliations and weak economic integration with the rest of 
the country.”307 Even though particularly the Kurds were involved in much of the ethnic and 
political violence of this period, there is little or no evidence showing that Kurds were 
especially chosen to be moved to northern Cyprus “so that they could be more easily 
controlled and subjected to assimilation pressures” the way they often were in the 1980s and 
1990s within Turkey.308 In the case of the Yörüks, it is likely that resettlement to north 
Cyprus was a dual solution: “Turkey has been trying to settle Yörüks for … ages”, and many 
Yörüks had, in this period, themselves applied for resettlement.309     
 
After such calls for migration were made, those who had applied for resettlement on prior 
occasions, such as the Yeşil and Kemalkürt families, and those who were interested in trying 
their luck and starting a new life elsewhere, were told to meet at a specific location at a 	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specific time. They had to provide a picture of the family (see Pictures 1-3 below), and sign a 
declaration accepting the rules and regulations of the resettlement process. The rules were 
basic: 1. Ten copies of a 6x9 picture with all the family members who were migrating had to 
be handed over to the local Land and Housing Directorate (Toprak ve İskân Müdürlüğü in 
Turkish) within maximum three days; 2. Each family could bring possessions amounting to a 
maximum of 500 kilograms; and 3. Those who had reported their interest for resettlement in 
Cyprus were to meet at a specified location at a specified time. Those who failed to do so 
would automatically and immediately lose their spot.310  
 
	  
Picture 1: The Suiçmez family. Family picture required for resettlement.311  	  
	  
 
Picture 2: Unknown family. Family picture required for resettlement.312  
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Picture 3: Unknown family. Family picture required for resettlement.313  
	  
Civil servants met those who showed up at the designated location, and accompanied them 
onto buses (see Picture 4 below). These buses took the migrants to larger towns or cities in 
the province where busloads of migrants from nearby villages also gathered. The most typical 
assembly towns and cities were Çaykara and Sürmene (East Black Sea); Çarşamba (West 
Black Sea); Konya (Central Anatolia); Antalya and Adana (South-Anatolia); Muş and 
Diyarbakır (East- and Southeastern Anatolia). From these places a new set of buses stood 
ready to take the migrants to the port city, Mersin, whence ferries transported them to Gazi 
Mağusa in north Cyprus. On the buses to Mersin doctors and nurses accompanied the 
migrants, according to the Suiçmez family, to take care of any medical needs that might 
arise.314 Depending on the distance the migrants had travelled to reach Mersin, some stayed 
one night in a hostel before boarding the ferryboats bound for Cyprus the next morning. 315 
Obviously, the entire resettlement process was “paid by the state: the transfer, [and] the… 
tickets to the ferryboat”.316  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Picture provided by Neriman Çakır. 
314 Although they are the only interviewees who specified that there were medical personnel attending to them, 
others recounted that there was at least one civil servant per bus accompanying them. 
315 Interview with Suiçmez, Yusuf; Interview with Halil Suiçmez; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview 
with an Yörük immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous; Interview with Çakır family; Hatay, Beyond 
Numbers, 12.  
316 Interview with Çakır family. 
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Picture 4: A group of buses were ready to take these migrants to Çaykara.317 
	  
In addition to influential people such as imams and village elders encouraging villagers to 
migrate to north Cyprus, family members and neighbors who had taken up the call and 
already moved to the island often sent letters back home and convinced more to come.318 In 
some cases, the head of the family went to Cyprus to find out if it was worth moving. One 
interviewee, a Kurd who migrated to Minareliköy in the Lefkoşa district of northern Cyprus, 
stated that his village near Muş in Turkey was slowly but steadily being flooded due to the 
construction of a nearby dam.319 Erection of this dam began “early in [19]75, so they [the 
authorities] told people it [the village] is going to be underneath the water.”320 He recounted 
that he chose to move to the island because he had been told that there was a need for hocas, 
or religious teachers, there. After he moved there to become a religious teacher, he convinced 
all his relatives from his village in Turkey to come as well. In order to keep the extended 
family close and intact, many continually attempted to encourage more relatives to migrate to 
northern Cyprus.321  
 
Migration to north Cyprus was in that way kept alive from the end of 1974 to 1980, through 
state encouragement, encouragement from influential community leaders, and invitations 
from family members. Thus, both ordinary and “manipulate[d] push-pull factors” influenced 
migrants from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus.322 After the coup d’état in Turkey on 12 
September 1980, migration to northern Cyprus halted for a few years. Due to the martial law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Picture provided by Neriman Çakır. 
318 Interview with Yel. 
319 Interview with a Kurdish immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous. 
320 Interview with a Kurdish immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous. 
321 Interview with a Kurdish immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous; Interview with Çakır family. 
322 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 619. 
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that was put in place following the coup, it was hard for ordinary Turks to obtain a passport, 
and the permission to leave the country, according to Hatay. Thus, 1980 thus marks the end 
of the first wave of Turkish migration to north Cyprus.323 So, between 1974 and 1980, 
northern Cyprus had to deal with settling a substantial amount of immigrants who left less 
privileged areas of Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Interview with Hatay; Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 7, Table 1.1. 
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5. The northern Cypriot Dream: Turkish 
Immigration to north Cyprus 1974-1980 
 
The division of Cyprus resulted in a Turkish-Cypriot north and a Greek-Cypriot south. As a 
result of the 1974 war and the consequent Vienna III Agreement of 2 August 1975, there was 
an exodus of a total of about 180,000 Greek-Cypriots from the northern part of the island. 
Furthermore, approximately 60,000 Turkish-Cypriots arrived in the north by the end of 1975. 
Thus, the north experienced a net loss of circa 120,000 inhabitants.324 Consequently, the 
authorities in northern Cyprus concluded a “co-operation and development project” with 
Turkey.325 This agreement aimed at facilitating the incorporation of the 90,000 refugees and 
immigrants that entered north Cyprus in the period from 1974 to 1980. Approximately 30,000 
of those who arrived were immigrants from Turkey. They were of various ethnic, linguistic 
and geographic backgrounds.326 Why were the immigrants needed in northern Cyprus in this 
period? How did the immigration process work, and to what extent was it successful in 
contributing to an economic and political independence from South-Cyprus?   
 
Resettling Turkish-Cypriot refugees 
For the new Turkish-Cypriot political entity in northern Cyprus, one of the main economic 
objectives was “to make best use of the idle factors of production”.327 One of the most 
important aspects of taking advantage of idle resources was encouraging immigration from 
Turkey. However, the first task was the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriots who moved to 
northern Cyprus from South-Cyprus following the 1974 war. From 20 July 1974 until the end 
of 1975 more than half of all Turkish-Cypriots were displaced as a result of the war. Many of 
them moved north, with the aid of UNFICYP, after the signing of the Vienna III Agreement 
on 2 August 1975, as stipulated in the agreement’s first article.328 The Turkish-Cypriot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 E-mail correspondence with Ishak. See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
325 Atun, Hakkı, “Kıbrıs’ta Göçmenlerin İskanı” [“Settlement of Immigrants in Cyprus”]. Rapor 6. Uluslararası 
Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Kongresi için, 24-26 Ekim 2007 [Report for the 6th International Congress on Cyprus 
Studies, 24-26 October 2007]: 383-397. Document in the possession of Hakkı Atun. 
326 Atun, “Kıbrıs’ta Göçmenlerin İskanı”. 
327 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 89. 
328 Gürel, Ayla, Mete Hatay & Christalla Yakinthou, Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and 
Military Strife. Report 5: An Overview of Events and Perceptions. PRIO Cyprus Center Report 5/2012. Oslo: 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2012, 11; Gürel & Özersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus, 11-20; 
UNSC, UN Document S/11789, 5 August 1975. See chapter 3 of this thesis for a more in-depth discussion on 
the Vienna III Agreement and the Turkish-Cypriot interpretation of it. 
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refugees from the south were obviously also a vital group for the use of the resources that 
were suddenly in Turkish-Cypriot hands after the division of the island. Furthermore, they 
were crucial for the creation of a Turkish-Cypriot political entity. In fact, article 32 (2) of the 
constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) specifies that “[r]efugees shall 
have priority in the distribution of land.”329 
 
Resettling Turkish-Cypriots from the south was of primary concern and therefore had priority 
initially. Consequently, a ministry with the main objective of housing the internally displaced 
Turkish-Cypriots, and settling immigrants from Turkey, was set up following the division of 
the island. According to Hakkı Atun, who was the first Minister of Housing and 
Rehabilitation, and Tamer Gazioğlu, Chief of Resources, Inventory and Statistics Section in 
Atun’s department, there was a concise methodology used in the process of resettling both 
Turkish-Cypriots from Southern Cyprus and settling immigrants from Turkey.330 Comparing 
the process with the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s, Atun 
argued, in a personal interview, that the case of northern Cyprus “was much more orderly and 
scientific.”331 It involved preparing a list of all the properties and land that Turkish-Cypriots 
left in the south. Furthermore, 
[t]he same survey was carried out for each empty settlement in the north, and the number and type 
of the existing houses, shops and workshops and the amount and type of agricultural resources, 
existing infrastructure and means of communications and degree of accessibility was found out.332 
 
Due to the large exodus of peoples from the North compared to a much smaller influx, 
“the land and settlements, houses and villages, even parts of towns were empty. So we 
had to house these empty settlements, and we had to irrigate and look after the land”, 
stated Atun.333 This was a massive undertaking. The human implications were great, as 
many of the refugees had been displaced on prior occasions following civil strife in the 
1950s and 1960s. Many were afraid of living in the south as a consequence of the war.334 
 
At first it was widely believed that resettlement and movement to the north was only a 
temporary measure that would be reversed once the situation on the island calmed down 
again, and a solution to the conflict was found. This had partly been the case during the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 36.  
330 Interview with Atun; Interview with Gazioğlu. 
331 Interview with Atun. 
332 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 89, 104. 
333 Interview with Atun.  
334 See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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previous periods of civil strife.335 Therefore, many saw the movement to the north as 
only an interim situation. Gazioğlu admitted that even on the administrative level, many 
thought it was only temporary.336 As a result, “no title deeds were given and people 
never spent even one penny to paint, [or] to repair the homes that they were living in, 
because they thought ‘this does not belong to me, why should I invest money in it? I 
might be thrown away one day’”.337 As time went on, and a solution was not yet reached, 
ownership rights were eventually given to those Turkish-Cypriots who had left properties 
in the south and moved north. Political pressure and dissatisfaction from the refugee 
population resulted in the Resettlement, Land Distribution, and Equivalent Property Law 
(İTEM Law) for the handing over of such ownership rights. It was passed on 3 August 
1977.338 The law aimed to make legal the policies carried out between 20 July 1974 and 
3 August 1977 in regards to the “provision of land, equipment, livestock and loans to 
those in the agricultural sectors” and “provision, in accordance with family size, of 
adequate social housing and essential household goods” to both refugees and 
immigrants.339 Thus, the law was both retroactive and proactive.  
 
The Turkish-Cypriots refugees who had been given properties in the north were given 
ownership rights and therein the right to sell and pass on their new properties in 
accordance with the İTEM Law. With the definitive possessory certificates, showing that 
the properties awarded to the displaced persons legally belonged to them, the Turkish-
Cypriot refugees “started to repair their houses … to upgrade them, to paint them … to 
add a new room next to it”.340 Both parallel to and following the resettlement of Turkish-
Cypriot refugees, immigrants from Turkey were settled in northern Cyprus using a 
similar methodology.   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Bryant, Rebecca, Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife. Report 2: Life Stories: 
Turkish Cypriot Community. PRIO Cyprus Center Report 2/2012. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 
2012, 9. 
336 Interview with Gazioğlu. 
337 Interview with Gazioğlu. 
338 Commonly referred to as the İTEM Law: İskan, Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası in Turkish. 
339 Interview with Gazioğlu; Interview with Atun; Gürel, Displacement in Cyprus Report 4, 23-24.  
340 Interview with Gazioğlu; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Gürel, Ayla in Lefkoşa, Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 21 February 2013.  
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Immigration from Turkey 
Already on 9 September 1974, not yet a month after the completion of Turkey’s second 
intervention in Cyprus, “Turkish mainland authorities announced that 5,000 farm workers 
were to be sent to Cyprus as ‘seasonal workers’ to look after the abandoned farms and 
orchards.”341 The Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus at the time, Vedat Çelik, insisted that contrary to widespread belief, it was the 
Turkish-Cypriot authorities that demanded the importation of a labor force from Turkey. 
According to him, the Turkish authorities did not promote the immigration of mainlanders.342 
Nevertheless, they were vital in order to carry out the migration process. With vast amounts 
of land compared to population size, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities needed to make up for 
the loss through the importation of Turkish labor from mainland Turkey. In the calls for labor 
that were sent around to villages in Turkey, it was specified that people were needed to 
improve the economy of the region, especially within the agricultural sector.343 Çelik argued 
that “we had to bring in labor force from Turkey because … although we now consider 
ourselves to be populated, then we were very, very under-populated and we couldn’t cope 
with the agricultural requirements at the time.”344 
 
Immigrants who came in the first wave of immigration lived in a total of 87 locations. At the 
time there were three cities and towns and 200 villages in northern Cyprus, meaning that 
nearly half of all villages, towns and cities were used for the settlement of immigrants from 
Turkey. All four districts, Girne; Gazi Mağusa; Lefkoşa; and Larnaka, that fall within the 
borders of northern Cyprus, were used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey. For the 
most part, the immigrants were given houses and land in villages and towns that were in the 
periphery, and far away from the major cities and towns. The villages Sadrazamköy, in the 
Girne district, and Dipkarpaz, in the Gazi Mağusa district, are the best examples of this 
practice. Notably, the villages in the immediate surroundings of the main cities were not used 
to house the immigrants. The villages and towns of Alaköy; Haspolat; Minareliköy; 
Balıkesir; and Değirmenlik, on the outskirts of the capital, and Tuzla; Mutluyaka; Yeni 
Boğaziçi; and Mormenekşe, surrounding Gazi Mağusa, are exceptions in this regard. None of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Hitchens, Cyprus, 105. 
342 Interview with Çelik. 
343 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İl Toprak ve İskan Müdürlüğü [The Turkish Republic Provincial Land and Housing 
Directorate], “Duyuru Antalya Valiliğinden” [Announcement from the Antalya Governorship], 3 April 1975. 
Document in the possession of Mustafa Yeşil. 
344 Interview with Çelik. See chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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the major cities, with the notable exception of Gazi Mağusa, housed immigrants. The 
majority of these 87 locations were mixed. That is, they were inhabited by the original 
Turkish-Cypriot population, Turkish-Cypriot refugees and immigrants from Turkey (and, in a 
very few cases, in the Karpassia Peninsula, the original Greek-Cypriot inhabitants, of which 
there were 1,600). However, there were only a few villages that were entirely occupied by 
immigrants from the mainland. The most peripheral area of north Cyprus, the Karpassia  
Peninsula, was widely used for housing immigrants from Turkey, and became inhabited 
mostly by these newcomers. The cities and towns that were important for citrus production, 
such as Güzelyurt and Maraş, a suburb to Gazi Mağusa, were importantly used for the 
settlement of immigrants. Another notable trend was that villages along the northern coast of 
Cyprus, especially west of Girne, housed immigrants from the Black Sea region of Turkey.345  
 
	  
Map 3: Cyprus after 1974 division.346  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 See chapter 3 of this thesis. TRNC Archive Doc. No. 873; TRNC Archive Doc. No. 89, 103; Gürel, Ayla, 
Mete Hatay, Nicos Trimikliniotis, Olga Demetriou, Rebecca Bryant & Christalla Yakinthou, Internal 
Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife. Internal Displacement in 
Cyprus. PRIO Cyprus Centre, 30 Sept. 2011, accessed 21 May 2013. <http://www.prio-cyprus-
displacement.net/default.asp?id=245>. 
346 Source: http://www.cyprus-maps.com/maps/Cyprus_big.gif 
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Map 4: Gazi Mağusa city and surroundings, north Cyprus.347  
	  
Map 5: Karpassia Peninsula, north Cyprus.  
 
	  
Map 6: The Mesarya plain, north Cyprus. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 The circles in these maps represent locations inhabited by immigrants. 
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Map 7: The Girne region of north Cyprus. 
	  
Those who came as part of “[t]he systematic settlement policy pursued by Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriot government” were a part of both a political and economic deliberation.348 
The political aspect involved increasing the population of north Cyprus, and the consolidation 
of an independent Turkish-Cypriot entity in the north. The economic aspects of the policy 
were means of reaching the same goal: independence from the Greek-Cypriots in the south 
through economic self-sufficiency. Notably, most of the immigrants in the first wave were 
farmers sent to northern Cyprus in order to cultivate the fertile agricultural lands abandoned 
exodus of Greek-Cypriots. Although it is clear that many of the immigrants were subject to a 
planned settlement policy, the immigrants mainly moved away from areas of Turkey 
characterized by harsh living conditions. Therefore, they saw an opportunity in moving to 
northern Cyprus, where they were given dwelling, land and agricultural equipment according 
to their family size.349 The İTEM Law defined those who were eligible to receive property in 
north Cyprus, and stipulated that “persons who were forced by Turkish authorities to change 
location [due to the destruction of villages because of the construction of dams and highways, 
or landslides]” and “persons who were approved to be settled because their labour, know-
how and capital could assist in overall development” in northern Cyprus, were intended for 
settlement.350  	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 215. 
349 See chapter 4 of this thesis. Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 216-218; Hatay, Beyond 
Numbers, 12. 
350 Gürel, Displacement in Cyprus Report 4, 25. 
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According to Hitchens there were three facts regarding Turkish migration to northern Cyprus, 
all of which were, in his eyes, indisputable.351 One, the process of immigration was “hasty 
and inept”; two, “it was connected to the plans of extremist forces in Turkey”; and three, “it 
was not a success with the indigenous Turkish Cypriots.”352 The first point is arguably a 
claim with relatively good backing. President Denktaş complained about the selection of 
Turkish immigrants and argued that they were not necessarily cut out for the work they came 
to northern Cyprus for. The large amount of immigrants coming into northern Cyprus in just 
a seven-year period, from 1974 until 1980, gives perspective to the haste with which it was 
carried out.353 Atun specifies that the authorities needed to be quick and timely in the 
immigration process because “there were gardens in need of irrigation, land waiting to be 
cultivated and fruit trees that needed to be picked.”354 There was therefore an urgent need for 
sufficient labor from Turkey, who could carry out these needs.   
 
Hitchens’ second and third arguments are more debatable. Dr. Erdal Onurhan, Cabinet 
Minister in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus throughout the 1980s, claimed in a 
personal interview that Turkish immigrants were invited to north Cyprus solely to aid with 
“the basic necessity at that time, to get things going”, and that there was no other reason that 
they came.355 He thereby attempted to negate the idea that immigrants were brought to alter 
the demographics of Cyprus. Although Onurhan may be biased in this regard, and perhaps 
was reluctant to admit that the immigration process was part of a deliberate plan to alter the 
population, there is no specific evidence suggesting that there were any ideological intentions 
in the Turkish immigration process. Nevertheless, there was a clear economic aspect, with a 
political intention of self-sufficiency from the Greek-Cypriots.356   
 
In addition to the labor immigration, there was also a group of Turkish soldiers who had 
either participated in the Turkish intervention of 1974 or had been part of the Turkish military 
contingent stationed in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance, who settled in north 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Hitchens, Cyprus, 109. 
352 Hitchens, Cyprus, 109. 
353 The number of immigrants in this seven-year period lies between 30,000 and 45,000 depending on the 
source. It is difficult to know the exact amount, as it has not been affirmed and recorded, but it is likely to be 30-
45 thousand. 
354 Atun, “Kıbrıs’ta Göçmenlerin İskanı”, 387.  
355 Dr. Erdal Onurhan was Assistant General Manager at Sanayi Holding, a public enterprise in north Cyprus, 
from 1978 until 1981 and has been a Cabinet Minister and Member of Parliament in the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on and off throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Interview with Onurhan. 
356 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 105. 
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Cyprus following the 1974 war.357 In addition, families of soldiers who had lost their lives in 
the intervention were invited to move to north Cyprus. They were given land, housing and 
immovable property and citizenship by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities and were often cited 
as proof that Turkey was “Turkifying” northern Cyprus through militarization. However, 
relatively few soldiers and veterans moved to north Cyprus following the war.358 It may be 
true that a long-term goal was to change the overall demographics of the island for a more 
favorable ratio for the Turkish-Cypriots, a desirable side effect of the need for a large 
workforce. But the primary goal of the immigration, at least in the beginning, was arguably to 
rebuild the economy of northern Cyprus and enable unused land to be cultivated.   
 
Sarah Ladbury, an anthropology researcher on the Turkish-Cypriot people, claims that by 
1977, excluding the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, there had been a population increase of 40,000 
in northern Cyprus compared to before 1974.359 Although some of this increase was made up 
of Turkish-Cypriots returning to Cyprus after having previously migrated to Great Britain, 
Australia, USA, Canada or another country, the number was so substantial that the main 
source must be found elsewhere. In response to criticism from both the Greek-Cypriots and 
the international community regarding the scale of immigration from Turkey, many 
politicians and representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot administration have exaggerated the 
volume of returning Turkish-Cypriots émigrés from the aforementioned countries. They have 
been quick to defend the considerable increase in population in this period by citing a larger 
influx of returning Turkish-Cypriots and thus understated the extent of the immigration from 
Turkey.360 Though there certainly were those who came back to Cyprus after earlier having 
migrated abroad, numbers reveal that a total of 16,519 Turkish-Cypriots emigrated from 
Cyprus between 1955 and 1973. Therefore, assuming that they all returned, approximately 
half of the population movement would be made up of Turkish immigrants. However, that 
would be an erroneous assumption as there continued to be a considerable Turkish-Cypriot 
community in the aforementioned countries following the events of 1974.361  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 See chapter 2 of this thesis for a discussion on the Treaty of Alliance. 
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The immigrants from Turkey were described as “villagers from Anatolia and the Black Sea 
region, uneducated and poor”. 362 This made them prone to discrimination from the Turkish-
Cypriot population.363 While it may be true that later immigration led to widespread 
discrimination and racism against Turkish immigrants, initially it appears that the Turkish-
Cypriots generally greeted them with open arms. The first immigrants of the 1970s were 
mostly seen as saviors, viewed as an extension and representatives of Turkey, which had 
saved the Turkish-Cypriots from perceived inevitable destruction and annihilation, according 
to most immigrants, politicians and officials interviewed.364  
 
Yusuf Suiçmez, who came to northern Cyprus towards the end of 1975 from the Trabzon 
province of the East Black Sea sub-region of Turkey, remembers the reception and attitudes 
that they were met with from the Turkish-Cypriots. He recalls that “they [the Turkish-
Cypriots] were very respectful to the Turks [immigrants]”.365 There may also have been a 
feeling of appreciation and admiration for the Turkish immigrants, and a realization that 
“they came here, they shared their lives with you and they contributed to the economy, they 
contributed to the security, they contributed to … social life”.366 Atun concurred, and 
commended the Turkish-Cypriot population because, according to him, “nobody complained 
that we brought the people from Turkey.”367  
 
Mustafa Yeşil is an Yörük, a Turkish semi-nomadic group who mainly live in the mountains 
of southern Anatolia, immigrant from the Antalya province of Southern Turkey.368 He 
recounted of a festival having been arranged for the arriving immigrants in the port city of 
Gazi Mağusa, the normal port of entry for the immigrants, in celebration of their arrival to 
northern Cyprus.369 They were met with music and a barbeque party, at which “[t]hey 
sacrificed the lamb, and they played the drums and horns.”370 This hints of an enthusiasm and 
appreciation for their new countrymen who were essential for a quick economic recovery and 
were seen as a vital helping hand for the Turkish-Cypriots and their new political entity.  	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However, the immigrants were not necessarily cut out for the jobs that were short of labor, 
such as citrus husbandry.371 One of the problems was that the Cypriot climate was notably 
different from that of the places where the majority of immigrants came from in Turkey. The 
most vivid example was that of those who came from the Black Sea region, an area that has 
the most rain in Turkey.372 In comparison, “[t]he climate of Cyprus is typically 
Mediterranean with strongly marked seasonal rhythm in respect of temperature, rainfall and 
weather generally.”373 Cyprus gets notably less rain than most parts of Turkey and notably 
less than the Black Sea region. Most of the immigrants interviewed described the weather and 
heat in Cyprus as fiery and cited the lack of water as a major problem for farming on the 
island. The fruits and vegetables grown in Cyprus were often different from those in Turkey 
and particularly from the Black Sea region.374 Consequently, the authorities sent officials 
from “the agricultural ministry … to teach them [the immigrants] … how to cultivate” the 
crops that they were not used to from their points of origin.375  
 
In addition to the difficulties within the field of agriculture, there were major obstacles in 
setting up a new independent political entity for the Turkish-Cypriots, especially 
economically. The Turkish-Cypriots had been excluded both from the political and 
economical developments of Cyprus during the civil strife in the 1960s and therefore had to 
start largely from scratch in 1974 with little or no experience within these areas.376 Because 
of this, there was a dire need of expertise from Turkey in order to kick-start agricultural 
production, which was the main source of income for northern Cyprus. However, as with the 
example of the immigrants from the Black Sea region of Turkey, those who came to north 
Cyprus from Turkey were not necessarily right for the agriculture on the island.377  
 
There was a major need for a labor force, particularly within the field of citrus production, 
which was north Cyprus’ main export. In 1977 agricultural goods constituted 77.5 percent of 	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all exports, while citrus fruits alone amounted to 65.7 percent of agricultural exports.378 In 
some cases, even if immigrants were settled in distant villages far away from the nearest 
citrus fields, they were transported long distances every day to pick citrus in areas such as 
Güzelyurt or the outskirts of Famagusta, as this clearly was the most important product.379 
Kadir Yel, an immigrant from Adana, who arrived in northern Cyprus in 1976 at the age of 8, 
recounted that every weekend they travelled over 100 kilometers from his village, Büyük 
Konuk in the Karpassia Peninsula, to the citrus fields of Güzelyurt to pick fruits. This was not 
an uncommon practice, and Yel’s story does not appear to be exceptional. In north Cyprus 
agricultural production, in general, and citrus production, in particular, used outdated 
methods and relied heavily on labor.380 
 
Settlement assistance 
In order for the settlement process to proceed as smoothly as possible, the authorities initiated 
a program of settlement assistance. Each village, or in some cases groups of villages, were 
assigned one or two iskan rehberi (or housing guide) who took care of both those who were 
resettled from the south and those who were settled from Turkey. The iskan rehberi arrived 
in villages that were intended for settlement and prepared the houses and lands for the arrival 
of refugees and immigrants. Once villages were inhabited and people settled in, the guides 
lived in the villages with those who had moved there, and provided assistance with anything 
that was needed. Sometimes these guides stayed up to two years in the village to make sure 
that it was a smooth transition for those who moved there. It was also to show that the people 
were not abandoned and forgotten by the authorities, according to Gazioğlu, who was an 
iskan rehberi in 1974 in Çatalköy (a village mainly inhabited by returning Turkish-Cypriot 
refugees, and not used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey), in the Girne district of 
north Cyprus.381  
 
In addition to the iskan rehberi that lived in the villages with the settled immigrants and 
refugees, Gazioğlu  stated that “we were sparing houses for teachers and sending teachers 
from center to there to live and they were living [in] those houses … In larger villages we 	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were allocating houses to the police families.”382 This reveals the permanence of the 
settlement project and the goal of creating a durable and stable community for both the 
Turkish-Cypriot refugees and the immigrants from Turkey.  
 
In 1975, before the Vienna III Agreement between north- and South-Cyprus had been 
concluded, “statistics of the empty houses in villages, or empty villages … and empty 
neighborhoods of villages” were gathered and prepared for the settlement of both Turkish-
Cypriot refugees and Turkish immigrants.383 Lists containing the size of the properties, 
number of rooms and the furniture and other goods left in the houses, were prepared in order 
to allocate housing in a fair and just manner according to family size. In contrast to the case 
of the immigrants from Turkey that were to arrive, the authorities already knew, more or less, 
which villages to provide for the arriving displaced Turkish-Cypriots who were either waiting 
in the south or in the British Sovereign Bases (SBAs), Akrotiri and Dhekelia.384 “The villages 
they [the Turkish-Cypriot refugees] were going to be located was known and … how many 
houses is going to be need[ed] was also known”, thus it was easier to prepare villages and 
houses for the Turkish-Cypriot refugees.385 In fact, according to Bryant, 
[T]he Turkish Cypriot administration resettled Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south as 
villages, hence as communities, and indeed appears to have taken some effort to guarantee that 
the villages in which they resettled in some way resembled their own.386 
 
Therefore, those villages and/or neighborhoods of villages that were not assigned for the 
arriving refugees could be mapped out and lists could be prepared for immigrants from 
Turkey coming to the island. Those villages that were easily accessible and closer to town 
centers were for the most part intended for the refugees from the south. Villages far from the 
center, for instance the Karpassia Peninsula (vernacularly referred to as Cyprus’ panhandle, 
due to its shape – see maps 3 and 5), which were hard to access, were therefore largely left 
for the immigrants from Turkey, as the Turkish-Cypriots did not want to live in such isolated 
locations. Thus, one may claim that the authorities were more sensitive to complaints from 
Turkish-Cypriots, and gave them priority in the settlement process.387 Nevertheless, it did 
occur that immigrants were unsatisfied with the location that they had been settled in and the 	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house or land that they had been assigned, and accordingly were moved elsewhere and given 
a new home. Gazioğlu  recalls one such particular situation: 
we entered in Turunçlu … it was a mixed village before. And we … went there and repaired 
the houses, upgraded them for regular living. And we took a small group of villagers from 
Turkey … to move there … And one or two, maybe they were like leaders … they said: ‘We 
don’t want to [be] located in these houses, they are old’, because the good houses were located 
by the … Turkish-Cypriots living there … And we had not enough good houses there, and the 
houses that we wanted to locate them in, they didn’t want … And what happened? We were 
moving … ‘This village, Mousoulita [its Greek name], Kurudere [its Turkish name] … we 
didn’t have allocated anybody there yet, let’s try this village.’ … And we allocated them in 
this village.388 
 
Suiçmez recounts of a similar experience, as an immigrant:  
At first they settled us on [the] mountain … Mersinlik … But they told us that we would be 
settled in Değirmenlik, Kythrea [its Greek name] but they sent us to another place. My father, 
also other people, they objected and they wanted to see the place that [was] promised and they 
came to Değirmenlik.389 
 
Thus, although the authorities were more prone and inclined to give the Turkish-Cypriot 
refugees precedence and priority in the settlement process, complaints from immigrants, 
in particular from village heads or similar leader figures, could affect the settlement of 
such groups. Some even threatened to return to Turkey in order to be given better 
houses.390 
 
Like the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, the immigrants from Turkey were allocated land and 
housing according to family size. Therefore, the list of property was compared with the list of 
families arriving from Turkey and the properties in question were categorized according to 
size and capacity. Each village available for settlement was then divided into groups of 
houses according to size. They were then assigned a letter denoting its category, for example 
“A” for the largest houses, and a number within that group. The family list was subsequently 
grouped according to size and each family was given the corresponding letter denoting its 
category.391 Then, upon arrival to the village, each family picked a number within its group 
and was allocated a house, “like a lottery”.392  
 
As opposed to the Turkish-Cypriots whose houses were for the most part ready to be moved 
into immediately, the immigrants from Turkey normally had to spend some time in 
temporary housing in Gazi Mağusa, the port of arrival into northern Cyprus, before being 	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sent to the villages from which they could pick a house. The amount of time spent in Gazi 
Mağusa, though, varied from case to case. Sometimes villages were ready to be moved into 
within one or two nights upon arrival in northern Cyprus. In other cases, families spent up to 
a month living in a school dormitory or similar temporary housing in the port city. There 
were also some families who did not have to spend any time in Gazi Mağusa, and they were 
moved directly to their assigned village. In such instances, other family members or people 
from the same village in Turkey had already settled in a location where other houses were 
available to be moved into. Nevertheless, such instances appear to be the exception, and the 
rule seems to be that at least some nights were spent in temporary housing. While in Gazi 
Mağusa they were provided with all their meals, and they were taken care of until the villages 
for settlement were ready.393 
 
Not only houses were given to the immigrants. There was also a methodology involved in 
handing out farmland to the arriving families. Like housing, land was distributed according to 
the size of the family. On average 153 dönüms of dry farmland was distributed to families of 
five.394 However, farmland giving higher yields, such as citrus orchards, potato fields and 
vegetable fields, was awarded in smaller sizes. The Ministry of Resettlement, as it was 
renamed in 1976, equated 153 dönüms of dry farmland with 15 dönüms of citrus orchards and 
12 dönüms of potato and vegetable fields. In many cases land of that size was not available 
for distribution, in which case the difference between 153 dönüms and the amount of land 
handed out to a family was compensated through other goods or property, such as extra 
livestock, a shop or credit to be used in the co-operatives.395 In the words of Atun, those who 
did not receive the amount of land that was the norm, “were subsidized, they were reinforced 
by animals, [banana, olive or carob] trees”.396  
 
However, according to professor Morvaridi, the norm of 153 dönüms, or the equivalent of 
other farmland, did not always apply, and he claims that “each village had a norm determined 
by the Ministry [of Resettlement]”.397 After the passing of the İTEM Law, in 1977, land 
ownership was standardized to a larger degree. Turkish-Cypriots who had lived in northern 	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Cyprus prior to the division, and who had less than 80 dönüms of land were given more land 
in order to balance the land distribution across both the new and the old inhabitants of north 
Cyprus.398  
 
In addition to these policies of land distribution, each village had co-operatives that had 
stored “[l]ivestock, wheat, barley, tractors and other equipment left behind by Greek 
Cypriots”, which they allotted to those in need of such goods.399 Nevertheless, there was not 
enough equipment and livestock left behind. In many cases the animals that were abandoned 
by the Greek-Cypriots were dispersed or unaccounted for as a result of the war. In order to 
make up for such losses and provide sufficiently, sheep were imported from Anatolia by the 
thousands. Furthermore, cows were bought and brought in from the Netherlands.400 Another 
vital need for the agricultural laborers to carry out their work was money to buy crops. The 
co-operative system provided the farmers with credit, which “financed them to grow … their 
crops, to sell them, and then pay back.”401 
 
“[T]here was an urgent need to maintain and protect certain types of agricultural resources 
like orchards, greenhouses and especially vast citrus orchards … before they could be 
allocated to the people.”402 The norm was to allocate land and housing immediately. 
However, in the cases of vital land for the economic sustainability of the Turkish Federated 
State of Cyprus (TFSC), such as the ones listed above, co-operatives and public enterprises 
were established “for the maintenance and management of these resources.”403 Once 
production of such vital goods and products came back on its feet, the authorities “transferred 
all the production units … to private companies, or to private people”.404 Atun and Gazioğlu 
proudly asserted that the setting up of a Turkish-Cypriot political entity was a kind of social 
experiment.405 Housing and land was awarded “according to … social needs. It was like 
communism, in brackets”, in the words of Gazioğlu.406 
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As it takes some time to settle in a new home and village, the authorities provided meals and 
food until the immigrants could provide for themselves.407 Therefore, the villages were 
equipped with a “moveable kitchen from Red Crescent”, which cooked and prepared meals 
for the inhabitants.408 Furthermore, while preparing the villages and houses for new 
inhabitants, equipment and furniture were collected from the abandoned Greek-Cypriot 
homes. These goods and properties were stored in what were colloquially referred to as “loot 
depots”, and the iskan rehberi were responsible for redistributing these goods according to 
the needs and sizes of families.409  
 
In addition, food depots were set up in and around groups of villages, from which the 
inhabitants could collect rice, pasta and other food and household goods in exchange for the 
ration cards that they had been given. Normally, people were given ration cards for one year, 
with which they were given staple foods every day in order to get by while they were trying 
to work the land and kick-start agricultural production again. Some, however, have reported 
of receiving food from ration cards for almost two years. In these cases, however, they were 
part of the very first immigrants. Because it was a pioneering project, and it took time for the 
system to run smoothly, it usually took longer for them to settle down than for those who 
came later.410  
 
In addition to settlement offices in the various villages and groups of villages, there was a 
central levazım, or supply, office located in the capital, Lefkoşa, which provided 
“refrigerators … necessary equipment to us[e in] their houses. Cooking units, … washing 
machines if they existed. All kind of apparatus necessary in the houses”.411 After a few years, 
when the settlement process had come along more or less smoothly, the iskan rehberi pulled 
out of the villages and the number of settlement offices were reduced to only the largest cities 
and towns: Gazi Mağusa, Lefkoşa, Girne, Güzelyurt and İskele.412 
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The heterogeneity of the immigrants 
The immigrants from Turkey were a very heterogeneous group. The former Vice President of 
the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot Dr. Fazıl Kutçuk claimed that, due to this 
heterogeneity, the immigrants “had sectarian conflicts among them … lived away from each 
other because of blood feuds and who belonged to two different faiths.”413 While there is 
little evidence to back this story of blood feuds, it is true that the immigrants came from 
many different locations in Turkey. The ethnic make-up of the Turkish immigrants was also 
heterogeneous. Therefore, it is very erroneous to view the immigration as a homogenous 
“Turkifying” force as many critics of the process maintain. In truth, the immigrants were of 
many backgrounds and were by no means a purely ethnic Turkish group.414   
 
The complexity of the group leads many, like Hitchens and Kutçuk, to argue that there were 
inherent problems between the members of the different ethnicities. There is little proof to 
confirm or discard this assertion. Nonetheless, most immigrants interviewed have not spoken 
of any conflict between immigrants of different backgrounds. Moreover, politicians and 
officials involved in the immigration process deny that there were cases of ethnic violence. 
However, some have told of confusing encounters with immigrants of another ethnicity and 
an inability to understand the language spoken by the other. There were some instances in 
which Laz, in encounters with Kurds, thought that they had run into Greek-Cypriots because 
of linguistic differences. This gives an impression of the complexity and variety represented 
among the immigrants from mainland Turkey.415  
 
Atun, Atakol and Çelik negate that there were big issues and cases of violence between 
members of different ethnic groups in the immigration process. The authorities lacked the 
resources and the time required to divide villages along ethnic lines, as they perhaps desired 
to do.416 Regarding this question, Atun stated that “there wasn’t a direct policy not to mix 
them [the Turkish immigrants]. So eventually they had to intermix and live together, and we 
managed it, both with our local people and for the refugees [sic] that came from Anatolia.”417 
Nevertheless, there was an attempt to keep members of Turkish villages intact and in that 
way settle entire villages into new ones in northern Cyprus, so that in many cases entire 	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villages were inhabited by people from the same village or district in Turkey. This seemed to 
have been a goal for many of the immigrants themselves as well.418  
 
For the most part, however, villages were mixed in the sense that there were the original 
Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants, Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south and Turkish 
immigrants from different locations in Turkey. In addition to attempting to keep villages 
more or less intact when moving them to northern Cyprus, the authorities aimed at moving 
people to villages that they thought resembled the places that the immigrants came from in 
Turkey. Looking at the map of the distribution of immigrants from the Black Sea coast of 
Turkey, for instance, reveals that such immigrants mainly inhabit villages along the northern 
coast of Cyprus.419 Atun confirmed that this was largely how it was done: “the people from 
Turkey, mainly from Black Sea area, were settled along the coast. Not all of them, but most 
of them”.420  
 
Although there is little proof of widespread conflicts between the Turkish-Cypriot population 
and the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus, there were some cultural differences and difficulties 
in terms of adaptation for the immigrants in their new setting. Compared to where many of 
the immigrants came from in Turkey, Cyprus was more developed and modern. Many were 
therefore unaccustomed to Western toilets (known as à la franka toilets in Turkish), and 
luxuries such as bathtubs and modern kitchens equipped with modern electric- or gas 
stoves.421 According to Gazioğlu, who remembers receiving a number of complaints from 
Turkish immigrants regarding their houses, “[t]he houses … was not according to their daily 
living standards. Their social and economic situations and their daily living standards.”422 In 
some cases it was a challenge to convince the immigrants that they had been given adequate 
housing, and some complained of being handed incomplete or inadequate homes. Gazioğlu 
recounted situations in which families from mainland Turkey complained to the authorities 
about being given a house without a kitchen because the house lacked a wood-burning iron 
stove, which was what they were used to cook from in their homes in Turkey. He also recalls 
seeing bathtubs used as troughs for animal feeding because those that had been given homes 
furnished with bathtubs had never seen such a thing and did not know its conventional use. In 	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addition, he remembers having visited numerous families who converted their à la franka 
toilets into squat toilets (known as à la turka toilets in Turkish).423  
 
Such observations and memories led Gazioğlu to conclude that “they [the Turkish 
immigrants] were … very far back compared with our [Turkish-Cypriots’] social lives. They 
were more … conservatives.”424 It was not easy for the immigrants from Turkey “where 
styles of work and living are quite different in some important respects from those of the 
Turkish Cypriots.”425 In addition to being treated differently by the government, as seen by 
the example of the title deeds, the immigrants later faced discrimination from the population 
at large.426 There was, and remains to be, a sense among Turkish-Cypriots that they 
themselves are “Turks, but they have developed a culture with its own norms, values and 
belief systems”, which has increasingly become threatened by the influx of immigrants from 
the more traditional and religious areas of Turkey.427  
 
After the initial enthusiasm for the Turkish immigrants slowly waded, there developed an 
identity distinction between Turkish-Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey specific to the 
class and social standing of the mainland Turks. The Turkish-Cypriot community generally 
and historically associate themselves with the more secular cultural elite in Turkey. The 
immigrants from Anatolia, who were mainly workers or farmers, were therefore seen as more 
backward than the progressive Turkish-Cypriots.428  
 
While Turkish-Cypriot refugees were given title deeds following the passing of the İTEM 
Law, immigrants from Turkey were not granted the same rights. This was, arguably, 
because the Turkish-Cypriot administration wanted to prevent the Turkish immigrants 
from selling the property and moving back to Turkey.429 The difference in treatment 
between the two groups obviously led to resentment among the immigrants. The 
restrictions on land ownership meant, both in theory and in practice, that those from 
Turkey had secondary status in comparison to both the Turkish-Cypriot refugees and the 	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Turkish-Cypriots already living in northern Cyprus. Thus, with the combination of 
having to adjust to new surroundings and a new way of life and not receiving the same 
privileges as the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, the Turkish immigrants were often in a more 
difficult situation than the population at large.430 The policy of not offering title deeds to 
the Turkish immigrants was by many seen as unfair. However, northern Cyprus “needed 
people to exploit the resources … and to establish a proper administration.”431 “[W]e 
were afraid lest they sold it [the property] and run back to Turkey. Because we needed 
them for the production, they came here. We needed the labor force”.432 
 
Assistance from Turkey 
Turkey was the central actor in dividing the island after its intervention in July and August 
1974, and therefore had to assist the Turkish-Cypriots in developing north Cyprus. 
Furthermore, it also had extensive historical experience with population exchanges and 
movements. Turkey’s past of “Turkifying” areas has often been cited by opponents of the 
Turkish immigration as proof that Turkey was applying the same methods for the same effect 
in northern Cyprus.433  
 
Furthermore, the fact that Turkey was so involved in the process has led many to apply the 
term “settler” to describe the mainland Turks who came to northern Cyprus after 1974.434 The 
anthropologist Rebecca Bryant, who has written extensively on the Turkish-Cypriot people 
and northern Cyprus, argues that the Turks who came in this period “do not resemble settlers 
in other colonial nationalist projects such as Israel, in that many did not come of their own 
volition, and quite a few knew little about Cyprus when they arrived.”435 Not only were many 
unable to locate Cyprus on a map prior to arriving, they often had no other option than to 
leave their homes and villages in Turkey, for various reasons. This is perhaps why Atun 
refers to the immigrants from Turkey as “refugees”.436 However, they were given houses and 
land upon arrival and, in most cases, citizenship to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus 
(and became citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after its unilateral 	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declaration of independence in 1983), either immediately upon arrival or later. During the 
first wave of immigration, approximately 25,000 immigrants from Turkey were given 
citizenship of the TFSC.437 This led many, especially in the south, to look at them as 
colonizers whose objective was to take advantage of the Turkish-Cypriots and forever change 
the demographics of the island.438 This view has from the 1990s and 2000s gained influence 
in the north as well, and there is an increasing fear among the Turkish-Cypriots that they are 
being “outnumbered by immigrants from Turkey.”439 However, this view is more based on 
later immigration waves than on the first wave. 
 
The “co-operation and development project” agreement between the northern Cypriot 
authorities and Turkey was, in addition to aiming at the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriot 
refugees, also designed to coordinate the settlement of immigrants from Turkey into the 
new Turkish-Cypriot state. Moreover, there was a need for assistance within fields of 
economics and everyday affairs.440 In order to carry out such co-operation and facilitate 
Turkish assistance, a Co-ordination Committee was set-up in 1976, which discussed such 
matters and projects. This committee consisted of the Turkish-Cypriot President, the 
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the two governments, and the Turkish Ambassador to 
north Cyprus. With a direct link to the Turkish government, cooperation and 
coordination in projects requiring Turkish help was made more efficient.441  
 
Turkey, as the only country that recognized and assisted the Turkish-Cypriot fight for 
independence, was an invaluable resource and partner for the Turkish-Cypriot 
authorities. Atun attributes practically all developments and improvements in northern 
Cyprus to the help and assistance given to them by Turkey.442 He argued that it is futile 
for Turkish-Cypriots to criticize Turkey’s role in northern Cyprus because, “we need 
[and needed] the support of Turkey and … in the construction of all infrastructure: roads, 
airports, harbors, ports, even small towns, irrigation systems, everything was done by 
Turkey.”443 In order to finance these projects, Turkey provided money “through TC 	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Yardım Heyeti, the Turkish Aid Programme.”444 The Turkish-Cypriot authorities and 
cadres lacked the knowledge and experience to carry out such an expansive project 
without the help from Turkey.445 
 
“Turkey practically helped us in every problem that we had, whether it was an administrative 
problem, [or] an import-export problem”.446 This is how Kenan Atakol, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy in 1974 and Minister of Education, Culture and 
Training in 1977, saw it. Also in the field of Turkish immigration, Turkey played an 
invaluable role in assisting the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Without Turkey’s help, it would 
not be possible to welcome such a large Turkish labor force.  
 
In addition, Turkey sent experts within the fields of manufacturing, engineering and 
economic planning.447 Onurhan, prior to being Cabinet Minister, was Assistant General 
Manager of the public enterprise Sanayi Holding. This public enterprise “tried to 
accommodate all the production … plants that was left behind [in the north]”.448 In 
connection with that, Onurhan had to confer with the Turkish authorities, which helped kick-
start production in north Cyprus by “sending their engineers, by sending their production 
managers over here [northern Cyprus] and telling us how to do it”.449 The field of industrial 
production and manufacturing was somewhat of a special case because during the civil strife 
of the 1960s the majority of the Turkish-Cypriots lived in enclaves spread across Cyprus. 
These enclaves constituted approximately three percent of the island. Consequently, the 
Turkish-Cypriots stood for only circa two percent of the gross national product (GNP) of the 
country’s entire economy. Moreover, the Turkish-Cypriots were traditionally occupied with 
agriculture and public service, not commerce and manufacture. Therefore, the Turkish-
Cypriot population had little or no experience with industrial production and expert help was 
thereby especially needed within this field.450   
 
Atun reveals the importance of Turkish assistance in this process of resettling both Turkish-
Cypriot refugees and settling immigrants from Turkey: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Interview with Atun. 
445 Atun, “Kıbrıs’ta Göçmenlerin İskanı”, 387. 
446 Interview with Atakol. 
447 Interview with Onurhan. 
448 Interview with Onurhan. 
449 Interview with Onurhan. 
450 Olgun, “Economic Overview”, 270; Interview with Onurhan. 
	  94	  
at beginning, my Ministry, Housing and Rehabilitation, got almost one third of the [total state] 
budget and it was all sent from Turkey. We repaired the houses; we financed the people to buy 
tractors, to buy crops. So the Turkish Agricultural Bank, or Türkiye Ziraat Bankasi, financed 
this. And eventually, in a way, we borrowed this money from Turkey … but eventually we 
didn’t pay it back. So it was, in a way, a donation from Turkey.451 
 
He continued to underline Turkey’s crucial role for the Turkish-Cypriots in stating that 
“the role of Turkey in this [process], financially, technically, was very effective and was 
very necessary.”452 Without Turkey, the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriot refugees and the 
settlement of Turkish immigrants would likely not be possible. Furthermore, the setting 
up of a Turkish-Cypriot state in northern Cyprus would undoubtedly border the 
impossible without Turkish assistance. 
 
Was it a success? 
Both at the time, and retrospectively, many have questioned whether the immigration process 
was a success or not. When asked what he thought was the biggest mistake made by the 
government in the resettlement process, Gazioğlu responded: “allocating land to the people 
from Turkey in Famagusta [Gazi Mağusa], Maraş.”453 This response falls in line with the 
criticism that the people who moved to northern Cyprus from Turkey were not necessarily 
cut out for the tasks for which they came to the island. There were difficulties for them in 
adapting to life in the island compared to the life they were used to in Turkey. The example 
of Maraş, which is a suburb to Gazi Mağusa, the second largest city in northern Cyprus, 
second to the capital Lefkoşa, is illustrating in this regard. Only the very first immigrants 
were settled in this area as it later turned out to be problematic, both for a future settlement to 
the Cyprus conflict and due to overproduction and a subsequent deterioration of the 
agricultural land.454  
 
Approximately 3,000 Turkish immigrants were settled in Maraş. They were mainly working 
in the citrus orchards and later with greenhouse farming, once the water became salinized due 
to over-use. The interesting thing, however, is that many of those settled in this urban center, 
at the fringes of which there were citrus orchards, were Yörüks. They are a semi-nomadic 	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people from the Mersin and Antalya provinces of Turkey. Many of them were used to living 
in tents and travelling around with their herded animals.455 Upon arriving in Gazi Mağusa, 
therefore, some described it as being “like New York.”456 Some were overwhelmed by the 
differences that greeted them and returned to Turkey, while others refused to live in the 
apartments given to them, and moved into tents in the citrus orchards.457 
 
In response to the question whether mistakes were made in the immigration process, Onurhan 
responded that “it could be organized better … You had to fill in a gap very rapidly.”458 The 
haste with which people were needed seemed to be the biggest challenge in the process, and 
he held that “[i]t was probably not very regulated at that time.”459 Although that may be true, 
the large group of immigrants who moved to northern Cyprus in this seven year-period were 
settled in their villages and distributed houses and land relatively quickly and effectively. 
Atun insisted that “the amount of 30,000 [Turkish immigrants in the first wave of 
immigration] was more or less calculated”, however, he also held that the immigration 
process was “done in a very hasty manner”.460 
 
Priority was given to the goal of the “creation of employment as quickly as possible and the 
direction of people to production”, thereby kick-starting both the immigrants’ personal 
economy and the economy of the new state.461 From 1975 to 1980 there was an average 
growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 18.75 percent, with highs of 62.2 percent in 
1975 and 31.3 percent in 1976. Furthermore, every sector of the economy experienced 
notable growth in this period.462 Such growth “may be attributed to efficient utilization of 
human and natural resources”.463 In addition to such economic improvements, north Cyprus 
experienced great social developments.464 Thus, coupled with the Turkish-Cypriot refugees 
who were resettled in the north, the immigrants from Turkey directly contributed to the 
economic growth and social developments of the new Turkish-Cypriot political entity created 	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following the 1974 war. Politically, however, northern Cyprus may seem to have become 
more isolated and condemned internationally as a result of the immigration from Turkey. The 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its 1977 amendment deem settlement policies in 
occupied territories illegal, the state manipulated push-pull factors, in Professor McGarry’s 
terms, were therefore unlawful by international law. This, in addition perceptions and 
misperceptions, in the words of Professor Jervis, about the immigration process by both 
Greek-Cypriots and the international community, deepened the quagmire of isolation for the 
new Turkish-Cypriot state.465 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The Cyprus of 1980 was characterized by two separate parts, a Turkish-Cypriot north 
(approximately 36 percent of the island) and a Greek-Cypriot south, which were divided by 
an UN-controlled buffer zone horizontally cutting through the island. In the seven-year 
period from the division of the island in 1974, until the end of the first wave of immigration 
from Turkey in 1980, this physical division developed into a social, economic and political 
dissolution between the two communities. Due to the large exodus of Greek-Cypriots from 
the north and a comparatively low influx of Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south, there 
was a need in northern Cyprus for immigrants from Turkey. They were needed in order to 
work towards its goal of economic self-sufficiency and political independence. What areas of 
Turkey did these immigrants leave, what social strata did the migrants belong to, and what 
was their ethnic composition? Why did they leave their homes in Turkey in this period, and 
why did they migrate to northern Cyprus? Lastly, was the first wave of immigration 
successful in contributing to both an economic and political independence from the Greek-
Cypriot south?  
 
From Ottoman conquest to Turkish intervention 
Cyprus has been affected by the civilizations and powers that have controlled it throughout 
history. Prior to the Ottoman takeover of the island from the Venetians in 1571, its 
inhabitants were primarily a Greek-speaking Greek Orthodox population. The Ottomans 
settled Muslims from Anatolia in order to consolidate their power in Cyprus. Nevertheless, 
the two communities largely coexisted in relative peace throughout the Ottoman period. It 
was not until the mid-1800s that trouble appeared to surface. When the British were given 
possession of the island through an agreement with the Ottoman Sultan, a continued policy of 
separating the social and political spheres of the two communities through, for instance, 
separate education based on curricula from Greece and Turkey, the bi-communal character of 
Cyprus increasingly became a source of ethnic violence. 
 
From the mid-1950s the violence in Cyprus developed into a civil war-like situation, where 
the two communities had separate goals: the Turkish-Cypriots seeking taksim (division of the 
island) and the Greek-Cypriots sought enosis (union between Cyprus and Greece). 
Developments on the island had repercussions on the relationship between Greece and 
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Turkey. Both countries supported their ethnic brethren on Cyprus and were therefore 
increasingly involved in international discussions on the future of the island. Despite the 
deteriorated situation in Cyprus between the two communities, Turkey and Greece were able 
to come together with Great Britain in 1959 and agree on the independence of Cyprus. This 
independence was accompanied by three treaties, namely the Treaty of Guarantee; the Treaty 
of Alliance; and the Treaty of Establishment, which could be said to limit the degree of 
authentic sovereignty for the Cypriots. These treaties were meant to secure British (which 
still has two military bases on the island), Turkish and Greek interests on the island, thereby 
creating and intensifying difficulties and potential for future conflict.  
 
Due to the nature of the Cypriot form of government, consociationalism, which bases 
parliamentary membership on ethnic affiliation, many observers viewed Cyprus’ 
independence and political system as a sham. The Turkish-Cypriots were given 30 percent of 
the seats in parliament, and veto power, due to their minority status. The Greek-Cypriot 
majority viewed this as unfair and unworkable. Therefore, Archbishop and President 
Makarios proposed a thirteen-point amendment to the constitution. The Turkish-Cypriots 
refused to accept such changes, as they were afraid that it would negatively affect them. 
Already in 1963 a new civil war-like situation broke out on the island. The violence 
developed further, and a majority of the Turkish-Cypriot population was forced into enclaves 
throughout Cyprus. This effectively cut them out of the economy and politics of the country. 
This isolation had repercussions for northern Cyprus after 1974 and resulted in a need for aid 
from Turkey, in the form of social, economic and political help. The Turkish-Cypriots were 
to a great extent ostracized throughout the 1960s until the Turkish intervention in 1974. 
 
When the extremist Greek-Cypriot organization EOKA B, with the aid of the military junta 
ruling in Greece at the time, organized a coup d’état against Makarios on 15 July 1974, 
Turkey saw the need to intervene in order to protect the Turkish-Cypriots. Although Turkey 
had desired to do so on previous occasions in the 1960s, they had been stopped by the United 
States. This time, however, enosis was the stated aim of the coup-makers, which spurned 
Turkey to refer to its right to intervene in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee. Initially, 
and in line with the stated treaty, Turkey sought to intervene bilaterally with Great Britain. If 
Britain had accepted, the outcome of the intervention could have been different as it would 
likely have taken place from the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in the south. However, Britain 
refused to participate, and on 20 July 1974 Turkey, intervening unilaterally, landed in Girne 
	   99	  
in north Cyprus. The military operation took place in two phases. The first operation was 
completed already on 22 July and resulted in the fall of the Greek military junta and the 
ousting of President Nikos Sampson. Thus, Turkey had fulfilled its duties as a guarantor 
power. Nevertheless, Turkey, after two peace conferences failed in Geneva, initiated a second 
military operation on 14 August. Two days later, on 16 August, Turkey completed their 
invasion and the Turkish-Cypriots ended up controlling 36 percent of the island.   
 
Developments in northern Cyprus 1974-1980 
Since the division of Cyprus in 1974 into a Turkish-Cypriot north and a Greek-Cypriot south, 
the two communities have become increasingly separated, not only physically but also 
culturally, economically and politically. The 1974-1980 period was characterized by the 
development of two more or less mono-ethnic states, one internationally recognized and the 
other solely recognized by Turkey. The fact that northern Cyprus has only received 
recognition from Turkey, has contributed to the increased reliance on the Turkish government 
for both economic and political developments. Furthermore, social changes have been 
influenced by both the presence of immigrants from Turkey and by the economic and 
political aid the Turkish-Cypriots received from Turkey. 
 
The economic situation in northern Cyprus following the war was difficult. Inflation and 
unemployment rates were high, and due to a labor shortage it was hard to take advantage of 
the citrus fields and production plants now in its possession. In addition to labor shortages in 
most aspects of the economy, the Turkish-Cypriots, because of their isolation in enclaves 
from the mid-1960s, were inexperienced within politics and economics. Although they had 
now achieved the independence from the Greek-Cypriots that they had perhaps sought 
throughout the 1960s, they relied increasingly on help from Turkey, both in regards to labor 
and expertise.   
 
Much of the state budget in northern Cyprus in this period came directly from Turkey. Hakkı 
Atun held that this money was initially intended as a loan, but that once it was clear that the 
Turkish-Cypriot government were unable to repay it, it was given to them as aid.466 Turkey 
continued throughout the period to subsidize the north Cypriot economy, and the Turkish 
government owned almost half of the shares in the main Turkish-Cypriot public enterprises, 	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Sanayi Holding and Cypruvex. Furthermore, northern Cyprus introduced the Turkish Lira as 
the legal tender, thereby practically importing the fiscal characteristics of Turkey.  
 
Developments within northern Cyprus have been interpreted from outside as being wholly 
controlled from Turkey. Although there certainly were grounds for such a conclusion, it was 
only part of the truth. The lack of international recognition, the failure of the inter-communal 
negotiations and internal political movements and opinions within the Turkish-Cypriot 
community has affected the changes that occurred in northern Cyprus during this period. 
Nevertheless, there are strong parallels between events within Turkey in the same period and 
developments and changes in north Cyprus.  
 
Migration in a context of economic, political and social crisis 
From 1974 to 1980, Turkey faced an economic, political and social crisis. Although the 
1950s and 1960s saw an increase in the country’s Gross National Product (GNP) and Human 
Development Index (HDI), the country was, largely due to regional differences, characterized 
by an economic disaster in the period 1974-1980. Unemployment rates were extremely high, 
and inflation rates deemed workers’ salaries difficult to survive on. In addition, as a result of 
large development projects, many areas of Turkey were affected by the construction of large 
dams or highways. Furthermore, land slides and other natural disasters destroyed many 
villages. Politically the country faced violence between left and right, and ethnically 
motivated fighting. None of the governments in this period, of which there were a few 
because of political crises, were able to deal with these issues. 
 
Due to these problems, many migrated from the countryside to the cities. The three largest 
cities in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, grew immensely in this period. However, life 
was not necessarily improved by moving into the city. In addition to urban migration, many 
Turks moved to Western Europe, especially to Germany, in the same period. It had also been 
normal for people in Turkey to move to other villages and rural areas if their villages were 
destroyed as a result of the construction of dams, highways or landslides. As space opened up 
in northern Cyprus, following Turkey’s intervention there, it was now possible to send 
victims of such development projects to new homes. The fact that many of the immigrants 
had to leave Turkey as a result of the destruction of their villages, and that many of them, due 
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to a difficult economic situation, sought a new life in north Cyprus, has led Atun to call them 
“refugees”.467     
 
Those who migrated from Turkey and went to north Cyprus in the first wave of immigration, 
were a composite group. The majority came from less developed regions of Turkey, namely 
the Black Sea (East and West), Central Anatolia, the Mediterranean region, Southeastern 
Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia. In addition to a large geographic diversity, the migrants were 
of different ethnic backgrounds. The most common were Turks; Yörük; Laz; and Kurds. It is 
therefore erroneous to view them as a “Turkifying” force, sent to northern Cyprus in order to 
increase the percentage of Turks on the island, although the vast majority were Turks. 
Furthermore, it is inaccurate to claim that northern Cyprus became mono-ethnic following the 
division of the island. It is true that Greek-Cypriots left for South-Cyprus (except for 
approximately 1,600 Greek-Cypriots who mainly lived in the Karpassia Peninsula), thus 
making north Cyprus more or less ethnically cleansed of Greek-Cypriots. However, the 
influx of people from Turkey of different ethnic backgrounds meant that northern Cyprus did 
not become strictly mono-ethnic. Therefore, while the immigrants were “agents” in the sense 
that they were encouraged to move to north Cyprus in order to contribute to the economy and 
consequently to the self-sufficiency and independence of the Turkish-Cypriots, they were not 
necessarily “agents” in the sense that they represented one ethnic group sent to increase the 
demographic percentage of that ethnicity.   
 
Although the immigrants were a very heterogeneous group in regards to ethnicity, they were 
rather homogeneous socially speaking. For the most part they were agricultural laborers, and 
thus largely economically disadvantaged and uneducated. Hence, traditional push-factors 
appear to have played an important role in the first wave of immigration, contrary to common 
belief among many Greek-Cypriots, politicians and researchers. Whereas these characteristics 
later made many of the immigrants from Turkey victims of discrimination from the Turkish-
Cypriots, those who migrated from Turkey in the first wave of immigration were welcomed 
with open arms and seen as saviors. This was mostly owing to the fact that there truly was a 
dire need for labor in the north Cyprus. It also has to do with the notion that Turkey was seen 
as the protector of Turkish-Cypriots and had saved them from perceived imminent 
destruction following the Greek-Cypriot coup d’état in July 1974. The immigrants from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Interview with Atun. See chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
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Turkey were seen as an extension of the savior, Turkey, and they were thus generally 
welcomed as heroes initially.  
 
The Turkish government co-operated closely with the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in the 
immigration process. Turkey had historical experience with population movements, as seen 
by the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s. In addition to this 
event, Turkey had broad experience with moving Kurds and other non-Turks to other parts of 
Turkey in order to “Turkify” them. There is little or no proof, however, that “enemies”, in the 
way professor McGarry applies the term, were encouraged to leave Turkey.468 It may appear 
to have been coincidental that members of different ethnic groups, such as Kurds and Yörüks, 
left Turkey and moved to north Cyprus in the first wave of immigration. A lot of people had 
to be resettled within Turkey throughout the 20th century due to development projects and 
consequent destruction of villages, and in many cases people of these ethnicities 
coincidentally inhabited these villages.  
 
Because of Turkey’s experience with population movements, both between countries, such as 
with Greece, and within Turkey, it was a valuable and able partner in the immigration 
process. Specific areas of Turkey were selected to encourage migration to north Cyprus. The 
authorities sent out calls to those districts of Turkey that were the most disadvantaged. 
Furthermore, village officials selected village elders, imams and others of high standing in 
the community to encourage people to sign up for resettlement in northern Cyprus. Imams 
were particularly useful to the authorities as they gave legitimacy to the process. Thus, push-
factors were decisive, but the authorities were also adept at employing and actuating such 
factors, as evidenced by the legitimizing effect of imams and other community leaders.    
 
These methods were mainly used to encourage those who were simply disadvantaged. In 
villages and districts where people’s homes were threatened from destruction as a result of 
the construction of dams and the like, the Turkish government obviously knew who and what 
would be affected. Therefore, people were told to apply for resettlement in advance. Before 
the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the norm had been to relocate families to other places in 
Turkey, a practice that often took a long time to carry out. However, with the opening up of 
space in northern Cyprus, many could be relocated immediately and be provided with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 616-617. 
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housing and land. Those that moved to north Cyprus were allowed to bring with them 500 
kilograms of possessions per family. Upon departure they rallied in designated locations and 
were brought to Mersin from where they were transported by ferry to Gazi Mağusa in north 
Cyprus. Accompanying them on this journey were officials from Turkey and, in some stated 
cases, nurses. Once in northern Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities had to find a way to 
settle them and make sure they could begin working within those fields that they were needed 
in order to kick-start the economy and gain the political independence the Turkish-Cypriots 
had been seeking.  
 
The northern Cypriot dream: Turkish immigration to north Cyprus 
As a result of the war in 1974 and the consequent Vienna III Agreement, 180,000 Greek-
Cypriots moved south and approximately 60,000 Turkish-Cypriots moved in the opposite 
direction. People from both communities on the “wrong” side of the buffer zone left or 
escaped to the other side with the help of the UNFICYP forces in Cyprus. Subsequently, 
northern Cyprus experienced a net loss of 120,000 people. It is in this context of a population 
vacuum that the people who had been encouraged to move from Turkey, through normal and 
engineered push- and pull-factors, in order to improve their lives could come to north Cyprus.  
 
This vacuum brought with it a lack of labor within most sectors of the northern Cypriot 
economy. It was therefore possible for the immigrants from Turkey to obtain work 
immediately upon arrival to the island. Furthermore, immigrants from Turkey were promised 
housing, land and other immovable property in north Cyprus. In that way pull-factors were 
manipulated, in accordance with McGarry’s theories, in order to appeal to immigrants from 
Turkey. It was therefore a relatively easy choice for most of those who migrated from 
Turkey. People who had moved to northern Cyprus in this period therefore also encouraged 
family members back in Turkey to move. In that way the immigration process, through 
traditional and manipulated pull-factors, was kept alive both by the authorities and those who 
had already moved.  
 
In order to allow for the immigration of approximately 30,000 people from Turkey, the 
Turkish-Cypriot authorities had a detailed and concise methodology. The settlement of 
immigrants from Turkey occurred almost parallel with the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriot 
immigrants from South-Cyprus. Priority was given to the latter. Therefore, the most central 
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villages were reserved for such refugees. Furthermore, the Turkish-Cypriots were quite early 
given ownership rights to the houses and land that they were given in northern Cyprus. They 
were given houses and land more or less in accordance with the amount of property that they 
had left in Southern Cyprus. This is one of the major differences between the methodologies 
used for providing property for refugees compared to for immigrants. Those who came to 
north Cyprus from Turkey were handed out houses in accordance with need. That is, the size 
of the property given depended on the size of the family. While the Turkish-Cypriots usually 
were resettled in villages and towns near the cities and in other central locations, the 
immigrants from Turkey were normally settled in more peripheral areas, such as the 
Karpassia Peninsula. There were, however, more central areas, for instance in and around 
Güzelyurt and Gazi Mağusa, which were used to settle people from Turkey. This was largely 
due to the citrus fields that existed there. Even in those cases where people were settled in 
areas far away from the citrus fields, immigrants were transported long distances every 
weekend in order to pick fruits. These examples illustrate that immigration from Turkey was 
first and foremost intended to fill the labor shortage within certain economic fields, 
particularly within citrus and other agricultural production, making them, in that sense, 
“agents”.  
 
The problem in this respect, however, was that many of the immigrants who came to north 
Cyprus from Turkey were not necessarily cut out for the agricultural production that they 
were put to work in. This was largely due to a significant difference in the climate. It was 
especially true with those who migrated from the Black Sea region of Turkey. Many of the 
fruits and vegetables grown in Cyprus were different from those that the immigrants were 
used to. Therefore, it was difficult for many of the immigrants to adapt. As a result, the 
authorities saw the need to send officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources 
and Energy to teach the newcomers how to grow and pick these fruits and vegetables. This 
was not the only form of aid and assistance that was given to the immigrants. Each village 
used for the settlement of refugees from South-Cyprus and/or immigrants from Turkey was 
assigned one or more iskan rehberi, or housing guide, who lived in the village and helped out 
with anything that the inhabitants might have needed. These guides stayed in the villages for 
up to two years in order to provide for a smooth transition. Furthermore, the immigrants were 
given ration cards with which they could collect staple foods, usually for up to a year. In that 
way the immigrants could focus on working the land and kick-starting agricultural 
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production, which was arguably the primary goal of encouraging them to move to north 
Cyprus in the first place.  
 
One may question whether the first wave of immigration was a success. The degree of 
success, however, depends on whose and what perspective one takes. The labor shortage that 
characterized northern Cyprus following the division of the island was, for instance, largely 
solved by the first wave of immigration. Consequently, the new state could take advantage of 
the natural resources available, particularly the citrus fields. However, in some cases, as with 
Maraş, irresponsible overproduction deteriorated the agricultural land. This consequence falls 
also in line with the notion that the first wave of immigration took place too quickly, with too 
many immigrants (approximately 30,000) in a short time span. Although Atun claimed that 
the amount of immigrants was more or less calculated, it was clear that the challenges this 
immigration process would lead to were not necessarily foreseen and thought out. The fact, 
for example, that not all refugees from South-Cyprus were resettled in northern Cyprus prior 
to settling immigrants from Turkey posed a challenge. Turkish-Cypriot refugees were given 
priority and were normally given the best houses and land in more central locations than the 
immigrants from Turkey. This sometimes led to resentment among the immigrants.  
 
At times the immigrants were not given land and housing in the village that they were 
initially promised. Furthermore, there were many myths surrounding a move to north Cyprus 
to the extent that one may call it the “northern Cypriot dream”. When such high expectations 
were not fulfilled, some immigrants decided to move back to Turkey. The majority, however, 
stayed in north Cyprus and presumably improved their lives and personal economy. They 
were arguably decisive in improving the economy of northern Cyprus, which experienced an 
average growth in gross domestic product of nearly 20 percent as well as growth in 
practically all sectors of the economy. The realization that there was a need for labor from 
Turkey created an initial enthusiasm for their arrival, as vividly illustrated by the welcoming 
ceremonies recounted by some of the interviewed immigrants.469 
 
The northern Cypriot Dream in a Context of Reciprocal Need 
One of the things that make this research important is that the subject is surrounded by 
misperceptions. This is largely due to the fact that the borders between north- and South-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 See chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Cyprus have been closed between 1974 and 2003. As a result of the division and a lack of 
communication and openness between the two sides, misperceptions and misconceptions 
have flourished about the other side. This is particularly true of the issue of the immigrants 
from Turkey, as they have been branded as “colonizers” and “settlers” by the Greek-Cypriot 
authorities.470 This is ignoring the fact that there are many Turkish students and seasonal 
workers in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as north Cyprus has been known since 
1983, who cannot be regarded as permanent residents, and certainly not as “colonizers”. At 
the same time, however, there are a lot of internal misperceptions about the immigration 
process among the Turkish-Cypriots as well. After an initial reaction of enthusiasm for the 
immigrants, many Turkish-Cypriots view the immigration wave with skepticism and are 
fearful of becoming a minority within their own state. The subject is thus surrounded by 
myths and misconceptions, which makes objective research on why the immigrants left 
Turkey and pursued new lives in the newborn Turkish Federated State of Cyprus important.  
 
The first wave of immigration from Turkey to north Cyprus from 1974 to 1980 in some ways 
fits professor John McGarry’s theory of “demographic engineering”. His basic argument is 
that “agents” and/or “enemies” move, or are moved, in such a process. Such movements 
often occur following a war or in the context of crisis. “Agents” are meant to play a 
consolidating role, solidifying the state’s control over a specific area or region. Therefore, 
they are normally enticed to move by promises of housing and land. This was certainly the 
case with the immigrants from Turkey, who were not only promised a house, land and work 
in north Cyprus, but were also lured by notions and presentations of northern Cyprus as a 
type of dreamland with great opportunities and possibilities. The immigrants from Turkey 
were needed in north Cyprus in order to ensure Turkish-Cypriot economic and political 
independence and self-sufficiency from the Greek-Cypriots. In contrast, “enemies” are 
viewed as a trouble group in the particular place they currently inhabit and are thus moved 
elsewhere in order to minimize their ability to mobilize against the state.471 Although 
members of different ethnic and religious backgrounds moved from Turkey to north Cyprus 
during the first wave of immigration, there was little or no proof or indication that “enemies”, 
in McGarry’s use of the term, were moved to northern Cyprus. Nevertheless, it is certainly 
true that ethnic and linguistic minorities were among those who moved from Turkey to 
northern Cyprus in this period. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”. 
471 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”. 
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While it is to a great extent accurate to describe many of the immigrants from Turkey as 
“agents”, who were moved to north Cyprus in order to contribute to the Turkish-Cypriot 
consolidation of their new state, ordinary push-pull factors certainly played a pivotal role as 
well. The political, economic and social situation in Turkey at the time was detrimental, and 
the society was crisis-ridden, particularly in the regions of Turkey that most of the 
immigrants came from. Therefore, a desire to improve ones life played an important role for 
most of the immigrants in this period. However, in line with McGarry’s theory, the 
authorities in northern Cyprus manipulated pull factors by providing housing and land. On 
the whole, one should view the first wave of immigration as a result of the employment of 
state mechanisms, as well as traditional push-pull factors in the context of crisis in Turkey 
coupled with opportunities and a need for labor in north Cyprus. After all, most of the 
immigrants who came from Turkey in the first wave of immigration were disadvantaged 
people seeking to improve their lives. This was either due to a difficult economic situation in 
Turkey, or because their villages and homes were being destroyed as a result of the 
construction of dams and highways or through landslides and other natural disasters.  
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